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WHY BARTLETT IS NOT THE END OF
AGGREGATED MINORITY GROUP CLAIMS
UNDER THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
SCOTTY SCHENCK†
ABSTRACT
The 2020 election showed the importance of faith in the democratic
system and the ability for citizens to cast a ballot for federal, state, and
local races. After the election, state legislatures will be redrawing
federal, state, and local electoral districts. Those new districts will affect
the voting rights of nearly every American. This Note examines Section
2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which has traditionally afforded
minority group members the opportunity to challenge discriminatory
electoral policies that thwart the ability “to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice.” This is an
important avenue that minority group members can seek to remediate
biased districting processes.
Claims brought by one minority group at a time—such as a Black
community suing to be a majority in a newly drawn electoral district
after being discriminated against in the district drawing process—have
been commonplace for several decades. But given the diversifying
country, these standard challenges are becoming insufficient. A newer
and more controversial theory pursued by litigants under Section 2 is
the “aggregated claim”—which is a joint claim brought by two or more
minority groups saying essentially, “We’ve been discriminated against
collectively.” This Note asks the question of whether aggregated claims
are permitted under Section 2 and argues that they are. In particular,
this Note examines the impact of a 2009 Supreme Court case, Bartlett
v. Strickland, on the viability of aggregated claims, and makes a novel
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argument based on statutory interpretation that such claims should be
permitted.

INTRODUCTION
For nearly three decades, constitutional law has required that
plaintiffs in racial gerrymandering suits prove the heavy burden that
race was the predominant motive for redistricting.1 In 2017, the
Supreme Court limited the ability of legislatures to use race as a tool
to achieve representation for minorities—requiring its use to be
remedial and necessary to avoid a potential Section 2 claim.2 In 2019,
the Court dealt another blow to voting rights activists when it held that
partisan gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable,3 possibly making it
easier for racialized districting to be done under the guise of
nonjusticiable political gerrymandering.
Taking these developments together, voting rights advocates will
look to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”) to ensure minority
populations can fully participate in the civic process.4 Passed pursuant
to congressional powers created by the Fifteenth Amendment, the
VRA outlawed various discriminatory tactics, such as poll taxes and
literacy tests, and created causes of action to challenge the effects of
discriminatory election systems.5 Unlike racial gerrymandering claims
that are typically brought as a constitutional cause of action under the
Fourteenth Amendment and require proof of intentional
discrimination,6 claims under Section 2 of the VRA apply to
1. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959–60 (1996).
2. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1472 (2017) (noting that while complying with Section
2 of the VRA is a compelling state interest, districts drawn based on incorrect legal interpretations
of the VRA would not survive strict scrutiny); Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer,
Race and Representation Revisited: The New Racial Gerrymandering Cases and Section 2 of the
VRA, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1559, 1590, 1598 (2018) (“Thus, when the government cannot
justify race-conscious line-drawing on remedial grounds . . . a racial districting plan will not
survive strict scrutiny.”).
3. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019).
4. See, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, Administering Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act After Shelby County, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2143, 2147–48 (2015) (describing
how Section 2 can function as an effective means to challenge districting).
5. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, §§ 4(a), (c), (e)(1), 10, 79 Stat. 437, 438–
39, 442.
6. Interestingly, the Fourteenth Amendment at the time of ratification did not promise
enfranchisement. See Travis Crum, The Superfluous Fifteenth Amendment?, 114 NW. U. L. REV.
1549, 1565, 1602 (2020) [hereinafter Crum, The Superfluous Fifteenth Amendment] (“[T]he
Fourteenth Amendment was originally understood to not protect political rights.”). Rather, this
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discriminatory effects.7 This difference is critical, especially for elected
bodies, given that intent is difficult to prove.8 Thus, the VRA (as
amended) made redress of discrimination significantly easier to
achieve for marginalized persons.
A vote dilution claim is one common method of challenging
election districts under Section 2. A minority community can challenge
election systems or processes as having a discriminatory effect if “the
political processes leading to nomination or election . . . are not equally
open to participation by members of a [protected class].”9 Like with
gerrymandering, vote dilution affects the power of one’s vote, not one’s
ability to cast a ballot. Plaintiffs can challenge districting that dilutes
minority voting power, for which a common remedy is to create one or
more new single-member districts (those in which one official is elected
from a given district), each with a majority–minority population.10
Section 2 redistricting claims, which this Note focuses on, were
first brought by single-minority group communities, whether they be
ethnic or racial minority groups.11 The Court in Thornburg v. Gingles,12
created three preconditions to these claims. It required claimants as a
community to show that: (1) they are large and geographically compact
enough to be a majority within a single-member district; (2) they are
politically cohesive; and (3) “the [racial] majority votes sufficiently as
a bloc” to defeat minority-preferred candidates.13 As communities
became more diverse, two or more minority groups began to bring
“aggregated claims,” where a cohesive community is made up of one
or more groups protected by the VRA. For instance, there may be a
was a creation of the Supreme Court in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). Travis Crum,
Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting, 70 DUKE L.J. 261, 264 (2020) [hereinafter Crum,
Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting].
7. See Voting Rights Act, Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134
(codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2018)) (adopting a “results” test for Section 2).
8. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130
HARV. L. REV. 523 (2016) (discussing the concept of legislative intent, both subjectively and
objectively).
9. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 (1986) (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 10301).
10. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40 (1993) (“[W]e have strongly preferred singlemember districts for federal-court-ordered reapportionment.”). But see Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II),
517 U.S. 899, 917 n.9 (1996) (noting that a complainant does not necessarily have “the right to be
placed in a majority-minority district once a violation of the statute is shown,” because “[s]tates
retain broad discretion in drawing districts to comply with the mandate of [Section] 2”).
11. See, e.g., Growe, 507 U.S. at 34–35 (evaluating a single-minority group claim).
12. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
13. Id. at 50–51.
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claim by a community of Hispanic and Black voters, who form a
community, typically vote together, and whose voting power is diluted
by a majority voting bloc in a given district.14 Circuit courts that allow
aggregated claims apply the Gingles preconditions to the minority
community collectively, but not all courts, however, have allowed these
claims to proceed.15
This absence of uniformity in the circuit courts highlights a central
question: Does Section 2 even allow aggregated claims? The answer
has far-reaching implications. American society is becoming
increasingly racially diverse. By 2060, non-Hispanic White persons will
account for only 43.6 percent of the American population,16 and
biracial populations will triple.17 Further, American elections are
starkly polarized, especially along racial lines.18 Even if some districts
begin to reflect a pluralistic society,19 there is fear that certain election

14. I use the term “Hispanic” to track both the statutory language (“of Spanish heritage”),
52 U.S.C. § 10503(e), and the language used in the relevant caselaw. Additionally, terms like
Latino and Latina are gendered, and while gender-neutral terms such as Latinx exist, these terms
are unpopular compared to Hispanic within this community as of the date of publication, and that
choice should be honored. See Luis Noe-Bustamante, Lauren Mora & Mark Hugo Lopez, About
One-in-Four U.S. Hispanics Have Heard of Latinx, but Just 3% Use It, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 11,
2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2020/08/11/about-one-in-four-u-s-hispanics-haveheard-of-latinx-but-just-3-use-it [https://perma.cc/MF2M-XNKU].
15. See e.g., Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1386 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (prohibiting
an aggregated claim from proceeding to trial); Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1244
(5th Cir. 1988) (allowing an aggregated claim composed of Black and Hispanic voters to proceed);
see also Growe, 507 U.S. at 41 (stating that if aggregated claims were viable, they would be subject
to the same preconditions as single-minority group claims).
16. SANDRA L. COLBY & JENNIFER M. ORTMAN, PROJECTIONS OF THE SIZE AND
COMPOSITION OF THE U.S. POPULATION: 2014 TO 2060, at 10 (2015), https://census.gov/content/
dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p25-1143.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5VW-JM44].
17. Id. In 2014, roughly 2.5 percent of the population identified as “[t]wo or [m]ore [r]aces,”
which is expected to grow to 6.2 percent by 2060. Id. at 9.
18. See Jon Huang, Samuel Jacoby, Michael Strickland & K.K. Rebecca Lai, Election 2016: Exit
Polls, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/11/08/us/politics/electionexit-polls.html [https://perma.cc/X3C5-WASE] (reporting that 88 percent of Black voters and 65
percent of Hispanic voters cast a ballot for the Democratic nominee, Hillary Clinton, while 58 percent
of White voters cast a ballot for the Republican nominee, Donald Trump). See generally Election
Results 2008, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2008/results/president/
national-exit-polls.html [https://perma.cc/6C9W-ZYJ8] (demonstrating correlations between race and
preferred political party from 1972 to 2008).
19. Cf. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., NORTH CAROLINA: 2010 SUMMARY POPULATION
AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS 154 (2010) [hereinafter NORTH CAROLINA 2010 SUMMARY] (showing
Durham County as 46.4 percent White, 38 percent Black, 4.6 percent Asian, and 13.5 percent Hispanic).
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and districting systems could limit the power of minority voices.20 One
need not look further than the responses to the 2020 election to see this
concept in action.21 For a further example, legislatures could pack
minorities into one district to weaken their votes elsewhere.22 Finally,
the recently closed 2020 census will be used to redraw electoral
districts, which Section 2 plaintiffs will almost certainly challenge.23
Though the Supreme Court has not ruled on the viability of
aggregated claims, it portended issues for them by altering the Gingles

20.See Amended Complaint at 2, 15, 31, McLemore v. Hosemann, 414 F. Supp. 3d 876 (S.D. Miss.
2019) (No. 3:19-cv-383-DPJ-FKB), 2019 WL 7856631 (noting that while Mississippi has the
highest percentage of Black citizens of any state in America, no Black person has won statewide
office in 130 years, allegedly due to a rule requiring candidates win the majority of the popular
vote statewide and win in a majority of the state’s 122 House districts); Ariel Hart, Jeff
Ernsthausen & David Wickert, Disputed Voting System, Racial Power Gap Persist, ATLANTA J.
CONST. (Dec. 7, 2013), https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/disputed-votingsystem-racial-power-gap-persist/xwhYqMwM2eGa1kCqMjo2IJ [https://perma.cc/W8KN-2XW5]
(describing the disparities in representation from at-large elections).
21. E.g., S.B. 90, 123d Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021); S.B. 202, 155th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga.
2021) (signed into law Mar. 25, 2021); H.B. 3920, 87th Leg. (Tex. 2021); see STATE VOTING BILLS
TRACKER 2021, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/
research-reports/state-voting-bills-tracker-2021 [https://perma.cc/HK34-FCR2] (listing over 700
restrictive voting rights bills introduced in forty-three states). Many of these bills seem to be
concerned with election security. It is, however, peculiar that in addition to alleged security
measures, some bills like the Georgia state legislature’s make it a criminal offense to hand out
water to persons standing in line to vote. S.B. 202, 155th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 33 (Ga. 2021)
(“No person shall . . . give, offer to give, or participate in the giving of any money or gifts,
including, but not limited to, food and drink, to an elector . . . [w]ithin 25 feet of any voter standing
in line to vote at any polling place.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-414(h) (West 2021) (making certain
prohibited actions, which S.B. 202, § 33 will add to, misdemeanors). More concerning, however,
is that the Georgia bill also adds new identification requirements, limits mail-in voting, and will
give partisan state election officials the power to temporarily suspend county election
“superintendents” and elect their own. S.B. 202, 155th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 6, 7, 25 (Ga.
2021).
22. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153–54 (1993) (describing district packing).
23. See Wisconsin v. New York, 517 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1996) (noting that the decennial census is used
to draw federal, state, and local election districts). Although the district drawing process is required
by federal law, states typically have the responsibility of apportioning federal and local districts. See
Justin Levitt & Michael P. McDonald, Taking the “Re” Out of Redistricting: State Constitutional
Provisions on Redistricting Timing, 95 GEO. L.J. 1247, 1253–54 (2007) (“For all practical purposes,
Wesberry [v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964)] and Reynolds [v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)] require a state
to redistrict immediately following a census—absent some other decennial timetable.”). The process
has started as of the publication of this Note, and will likely continue for several months, if not years
depending on litigation. For current progress of the 2021 redistricting process, see Justin Levitt,
National Overview, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, https://redistricting.lls.edu/national-overview
[https://perma.cc/942J-TV3X]. To see the timeline of the 2010 census redistricting, see Justin Levitt,
Maps Across the 2010 Cycle, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, https://redistricting.lls.edu/resources/
maps-across-the-cycle-2010-congress [https://perma.cc/CB3Y-TZ4A].
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preconditions. In 2009, the Court in Bartlett v. Strickland24 set a brightline requirement (or perhaps more accurately clarified the first Gingles
precondition) for Section 2 redistricting claims: the minority claimants
must make up 50 percent or more of the new district they seek.25 The
Bartlett Court set this rule when considering a crossover claim (as
opposed to an aggregated claim). In a crossover claim, a minority group
constitutes less than 50 percent within a new electoral district but could
elect its representatives with the help of allegedly consistent majority
“crossover” voters.26 Thus, by adding this new majority requirement,
the Bartlett Court said, in essence, “no crossover claims.”27 The
question remains, however, whether or not this logic extends to
aggregated claims.
This Note argues that aggregated claims are properly
distinguishable from the crossover claims left unprotected under
Bartlett. Aggregated claims significantly differ because they feature
two or more minority groups combined as one community—a
community constituting at least 50 percent of the new polity. Indeed,
White crossover voters are not part of the claim itself. They do not join
the complaint to the court, are not subject to the statutory tests of
Section 2, and are not part of the community alleging discrimination.28
By contrast, all aggregated claimants necessarily assert that they suffer
from discrimination because of their minority status. Thus, aggregated
claims are more like single-minority group claims than crossover
claims, and the Bartlett plurality’s rationales that disallowed crossover
claims under Section 2 are inapplicable. In other words, this Note
argues that two or more groups can identify as a single community and

24. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009).
25. Id. at 13 (plurality opinion).
26. Id. at 19. In a crossover claim, a minority group constitutes less than 50 percent within a
new single-member district but could elect its representatives with the help of majority (typically
White) “crossover” voters. Id.
27. The rationales given by the Bartlett Court were that crossover claims (1) are inconsistent
with the first and third Gingles preconditions; (2) were “contrary to the mandate of [Section] 2,”
which only guarantees an “equal” opportunity to elect one’s representatives of choice; (3)
increased racial considerations might run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause; and (4) crossover
districts instead emphasized racial distinctions instead of continuing progress toward the “waning
of racism.” Id. at 14–26. By extension, this also meant that legislatures did not have to account for
crossover effects when redistricting.
28. See id. at 11 (noting that only the minority groups of the crossover coalition are subject
to the Gingles preconditions, and by implication that White crossover voters cannot count
towards meeting the first precondition).
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are deserving of the same protection as a single-minority group
community.
Scholarly views on aggregated claims under Section 2 are split.
Early literature turned to a statutory text and intent debate over
whether the VRA could support such claims.29 After Bartlett, a dispute
arose among scholarly commentators as to whether aggregated claims
were dead in the water just like crossover claims,30 because of strong
29. Compare Sebastian Geraci, The Case Against Allowing Multiracial Coalitions To File
Section 2 Dilution Claims, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 389, 390–93 (“[T]he legislative history of the
VRA suggests that multiracial coalitions are not permissible.”), and Christopher E. Skinnell, Why
Courts Should Forbid Minority Coalition Plaintiffs Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
Absent Clear Congressional Authorization, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 363, 377 (“Just because
Congress clearly intended to interfere with state election systems by passing and amending the
VRA, it does not inevitably follow that courts should infer an intention to interfere to such a
degree as to encompass minority coalitions.”), with Katherine I. Butler & Richard Murray,
Minority Vote Dilution Suits and the Problem of Two Minority Groups: Can a “Rainbow
Coalition” Claim the Protection of the Voting Rights Act?, 21 PAC. L.J. 619, 623–24 (1990)
(“Ultimately we conclude that the dilution suit . . . should be extended to protect a ‘minority
coalition’ only in the most unusual of circumstances.”), Dale E. Ho, Two Fs for Formalism:
Interpreting Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in Light of Changing Demographics and Electoral
Patterns, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 403, 427–32 (2015) (noting that using the Bartlett rule to
prohibit aggregation runs counter to the purposes of the VRA, does not lessen the use of race in
district drawing, and would reduce the number of VRA claims), Sara Michaloski, A Tale of Two
Minority Groups: Can Two Different Minority Groups Bring a Coalition Suit Under Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 271, 274 (2014) (noting that allowing
aggregation “best accords with the fundamental purpose and underlying congressional intent of
the statute”), Rick G. Strange, Application of Voting Rights Act to Communities Containing Two
or More Minority Groups: When Is the Whole Greater than the Sum of Its Parts?, 20 TEX. TECH.
L. REV. 95, 126–29, 153–54 (1989) (warning that aggregated claims may require federal courts to
“protect political coalitions” and be dragged into “the world of interest group politics,” but noting
that in some narrow cases it may be necessary), and Aylon M. Schulte, Note, Minority
Aggregation Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Towards Just Representation in Ethnically
Diverse Communities, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 441, 467–74 (arguing that “aggregation . . . moves
toward more equitable representation” and noting that although the text of Section 2 is silent on
whether aggregation is allowed, the congressional purpose and history support using such claims).
Kevin Sette concluded that the text and intent of Congress supports aggregated claims. Kevin
Sette, Note, Are Two Minorities Equal to One?: Minority Coalition Groups and Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, 88 FORD. L. REV. 2693, 2734 (2020) (arguing that the term “class of citizens”
can support multiple minority groups).
30. This Note does not address, rehash, or engage in the early scholarly debate in depth. But
for a brief overview of the scholarship, compare Michael Li & Yurij Rudensky, Rethinking the
Redistricting Toolbox, 62 HOWARD L.J. 713, 724–26 (2019) (“[I]t is easy to see how, without
additional developments in the field, the Court’s logic from Bartlett could be imported to thwart
coalition voting rights efforts on communities of color.”), Audrey Yang, Treading Carefully After
Shelby County: Minority Coalitions Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 701, 702 (“While not the same as a minority coalition, the rejection of crossover districts indicate
that the Court would maybe not support aggregation either.”), and Lauren R. Weinberg, Note,
Reading the Tea Leaves: The Supreme Court and the Future of Coalition Districts Under Section 2 of
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statements against increased racial considerations and the fact that
individual minority groups in an aggregated claim might be insufficient
under Bartlett, even though the Court explicitly reserved this
question.31 This Note differentiates itself by, first, focusing primarily on
Bartlett’s impact and, second, providing a still-novel statutory
contribution through what this Note calls the singular–plural canon of
statutory interpretation.32
Part I describes the history and doctrine of the Fifteenth
Amendment and the VRA as repeated congressional attempts to
provide representation for marginalized groups. It details the history
of the law, some relevant terminology for voting dilution claims, and
the current governing legal standards. Part II addresses both
aggregated and crossover claims in the context of Section 2. It discusses
the rationales from the Bartlett plurality to demonstrate that

the Voting Rights Act, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 411, 430 (2013) (“However, the Supreme Court’s
previous treatment of this and similar issues suggests that it is unlikely that the Perry Court intended
to resolve whether section 2 requires the creation of coalition districts in such a cryptic fashion.”),
with Matthew Drecun, Stemming the Tide: Texas’s Demographic Change, the Voting Rights Act, and
the Emerging Importance of Bartlett v. Strickland, 22 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 103, 134 (2016)
(“Minority-coalition districts present different considerations than crossover districts, so the issue
should not necessarily be settled by the logic of Bartlett.”), and Ryan P. Haygood, The Dim Side Of
The Bright Line: Minority Voting Opportunity After Bartlett v. Strickland, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
(Feb. 25, 2010), at 14–15, https://harvardcrcl.org/the-dim-side-of-the-bright-line-minority-votingopportunity-after-bartlett-v-strickland-by-ryan-p-haygood [https://perma.cc/5HKU-C5Y7] (arguing
that aggregated claims should be allowed).
31. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 13–14 (plurality opinion) (“[C]oalition-district claims [are those]
in which two minority groups form a coalition to elect the candidate of the coalition’s choice. We
do not address that type of coalition district here.”).
32. Thus, instead of arguing that “class” of citizens can hold multiple groups, as circuit courts
and other articles or notes have done, this Note argues that even if it could not support that
interpretation, “class” implicitly contains the plural term “classes” because there is no text which
overrides this statutory presumption. See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (noting that, “unless the context
indicates otherwise,” that “words importing the singular include and apply to several persons,
parties, or things [and] words importing the plural include the singular”). This Note employs the
phrase “singular–plural canon of statutory construction,” to help simplify discussion because
caselaw typically refers to this canon by the statutory text of 1 U.S.C. § 1, which is often unwieldy.
See United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 422 n.5 (2009) (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 1); id. at 432 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) (same). Authors use various phrasings in the literature. See, e.g., Grace E. Hart,
State Legislative Drafting Manuals and Statutory Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 438, 458 (2016)
(calling this canon the “singular/plural rule”); BJ Ard, Comment, Interpreting by the Book:
Legislative Drafting Manuals and Statutory Interpretation, 120 YALE L.J. 185 (2010) (referring to
this rule as the “singular includes the plural” canon). Justice Antonin Scalia and his co-author
Bryan Garner referred to this cannon as the “Gender/Number Canon” in their treatise on textual
interpretation. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TEXTS 129–31 (2012).
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aggregated claims remain permissible. Indeed, Bartlett does not end the
argument over aggregated claims, given the substantive differences
between aggregated and crossover claims. Part III discusses the history
of a circuit split surrounding the application of Section 2 to aggregated
claims and advances a novel statutory argument. Specifically, the
singular phrasing of Section 2—using “class” instead of “classes”—
does not preclude aggregation because of the singular–plural canon of
interpretation.33
I. THE HISTORY AND DOCTRINE OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE VRA (1870–2009)
Reconstruction in America marked the end of the bloody Civil
War and the start of a new era in American democracy, where the
tenets of federalism and states’ rights were permanently altered.
Notably, the Reconstruction Congress passed three amendments to the
Constitution—the
Thirteenth,
Fourteenth,
and
Fifteenth
Amendments.34 The Fifteenth Amendment provides that “[t]he
right . . . to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.”35 It, like other Reconstruction Amendments, confers on
Congress the power to “enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.”36 The Reconstruction period lasted from 1865 to 1877,
where the Union occupied and oversaw the southern states under
military rule.37 Congress was controlled by Republicans who passed
several pieces of legislation aimed at reversing the effects of slavery.38
This effort included three constitutional amendments and several
“Reconstruction” acts, such as the Enforcement Act of 187039 and the
Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, to prevent southern violence at the polls.40

33. 1 U.S.C. § 1.
34. The Reconstruction Amendments, NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/learn/
educational-resources/historical-documents/the-reconstruction-amendments [https://perma.cc/K66ECYH2].
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
36. Id. § 2.
37. Eric Foner, Reconstruction, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/ReconstructionUnited-States-history [https://perma.cc/6LZT-4P46].
38. Id.
39. An Act To Enforce the Rights of Citizens of the United States To Vote in the Several
States of this Union, 16 Stat. 140, 141 (1870).
40. Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, 14 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1986 (2018)).
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After the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866 (ratified
by the States in 1868), which was widely understood at the time of
ratification not to confer a right of suffrage on freed slaves,41
Republicans in Congress sought to enfranchise Black voters
nationwide with various measures, including several Reconstruction
acts directed at southern states.42 The Republicans in Congress, before
the waning of their political power, passed the Fifteenth Amendment.43
Though ratified in 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment served as an empty
promise for decades.44 The right to vote, while treasured, proved hard
to exercise because of southern violence.45 As a result, from 1870 to
1880, despite Black citizens constituting 10 to 11 percent of the nation,
less than 0.5 percent of the members of the House of Representatives
were
Black.46
After
Reconstruction
ended
in
1877,
47
Soon
underrepresentation became even worse in Congress.
thereafter, the South employed various schemes to dismantle Black
voting influence, such as poll taxes, literacy tests, and grandfather
clauses.48

41. Crum, The Superfluous Fifteenth Amendment, supra note 6, at 1551, 1585; see CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham) (noting that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not give power to regulate “suffrage in the several States”).
42. See supra note 6.
43. See Crum, The Superfluous Fifteenth Amendment, supra note 6, at 1551 (“Passed by the
lame-duck Fortieth Congress in 1969 and ratified by the states in 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment
was the final act in the trilogy of the Reconstruction Amendments.”).
44. Jamelia N. Morgan, Disparate Impact and Voting Rights: How Objections to ImpactBased Claims Prevent Plaintiffs from Prevailing in Cases Challenging New Forms of
Disenfranchisement, 9 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 93, 94 (2018).
45. See Crum, Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 6, at 304, 310 (stating
that the Fifteenth Amendment proved “insufficient to protect the right of Black voters”).
46. IDA A. BRUDNICK & JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30378, AFRICAN
AMERICAN MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS: 1870–2020, at 4–6 (2020), https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30378 [https://perma.cc/4AY6-7QM4]; CENSUS BUREAU,
U.S. DEP’T OF COM., UNITED STATES SUMMARY: 2010 POPULATION AND HOUSING UNIT COUNTS 4–
5 tbl.3 (2012), https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/2010/cph-2/cph-2-1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GNY5-9HU5]; CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., 1880 CENSUS VOLUME 1:
POPULATION, BY RACE, SEX, AND NATIVITY 3 tbl.1(a) (1883), https://www2.census.gov/library/
publications/decennial/1880/vol-01-population/1880_v1-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZWS-M9L9] (noting
the overall population was 40,155,783 as compared to the Black population of 6,580,793 in 1880).
47. IDA A. BRUDNICK & JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30378, AFRICAN
AMERICAN MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS: 1870–2018, at 5–6 (2018), https://
www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/617f17bb-61e9-40bb-b301-50f48fd239fc.pdf [https://perma.cc/JPJ7-H4YC].
48. U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 1959, at
30–34 (1959); see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310–11 (1966) (describing
various tactics used by southern states to deprive Black people of the vote); 1 MARSHA J. TYSON
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Finally, the Supreme Court gutted civil rights laws and weakened
the reach of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Supreme
Court did so by invalidating the Civil Rights Act of 1875,49 limiting the
Fourteenth Amendment to state action,50 holding that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment only protects legal
rights under federal, but not state, citizenship,51 and then upholding
segregation as constitutional.52 The Court also held that the Fifteenth
Amendment, while preventing exclusion from voting on the basis of
race, did not affirmatively grant a person the right to vote.53 For
example, a state could have literacy tests and poll taxes (as of the time
the Reconstruction Amendments were passed) because these
qualifications are at least facially unrelated to race, even if they denied
the right to vote and disproportionately disenfranchised Black voters.
And, tools like the poll tax persisted well into the twentieth century.54
In fact, the “white primary”—where political parties adopted rules
excluding Black voters from voting in primary elections—was ruled
unconstitutional only as of 1944.55
It was not until 1965 that conditions seriously began to change
again. After signing the Civil Rights Act of 1964,56 President Lyndon
B. Johnson and the Democratic Party turned to voting rights, drafting
legislation that relied on congressional authority from the Fifteenth
Amendment.57 The framers of the VRA aimed at eliminating the blight

DARLING, RACE, VOTING, REDISTRICTING AND THE CONSTITUTION xiv (2001) (same).
Grandfather clauses were found unconstitutional in 1915, Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347,
366–68 (1915), and poll taxes in federal elections were made illegal by the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, and the Supreme Court held poll taxes in state elections
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
666 (1966).
49. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 (1883).
50. Id. at 11.
51. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 112–13 (1873).
52. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
53. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217 (1875).
54. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding poll taxes in state
elections unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment).
55. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944) (holding that state primaries conducted
by political parties, which are technically private organizations for many purposes, were state
action for purposes of the Reconstruction Amendments).
56. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 241.
57. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (noting that the VRA
was enacted “[t]o enforce the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and
for other purposes”).
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of racism from the electoral process by outlawing various forms of
voting denial, including poll taxes and literacy tests.58 In the words of
President Johnson, “Experience has clearly shown that the existing
process of law cannot overcome systematic and ingenious
discrimination. No law that we now have on the books . . . can ensure
the right to vote when local officials are determined to deny it.”59
In addition to dealing with plainly discriminatory policies, the
VRA included two mechanisms to challenge dynamic discriminatory
tactics. The first of these was Section 5,60 which essentially froze
election procedures for jurisdictions that met certain statutory
criteria.61 These jurisdictions would have to get approval from the
federal government to change their procedures.62 The second
mechanism, Section 2, originally stated that states and subdivisions
cannot use any voting practice or procedure that would deny the right
to vote on account of race.63 Over the VRA’s history, Congress has
repeatedly enlarged the scope of Section 2. In 1965, Section 2 covered
only racial minorities, as opposed to ethnic or language minorities.64 In
1975, Congress amended Section 2 to protect “language minorities,”
including Asians, Hispanics, Indigenous Peoples, and Alaskan

58. Id. §§ 4(a), (c), (e)(1), 10, at 438–39, 442; see also U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., U.S.
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, BOOK 1: VOTING 343–51 (1961) (documenting voting
statistics). For example, while 63.6 percent of White voters in Alabama in 1960 were registered,
only 13.7 percent of Black voters in the state were. Id. at 343.
59. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress: The American Promise (Mar.
15, 1965) (transcript and video available at the LBJ Presidential Library online archive), http://
www.lbjlibrary.org/lyndon-baines-johnson/speeches-films/president-johnsons-special-message-to-thecongress-the-american-promise [https://perma.cc/FJ7S-Q6TX] (“And should we defeat every enemy,
should we double our wealth and conquer the stars, and still be unequal to this issue, then we will have
failed as a people and as a nation.”).
60. 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2018) (originally enacted as Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439).
61. Section 5 froze the election procedures unless a state sought an exemption and its
companion, Section 4(b), applied a formula to determine which states were covered by Section 5.
Id. §§ 4–5, at 438–39. Section 4(b)’s coverage formula was struck down by the Supreme Court.
Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).
62. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439.
63. Id. § 2, at 437 (“No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice,
or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”).
64. See id. (preventing only discrimination that occurs “on account of race or color”).
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Natives.65 In 1982, Congress amended Section 266 in response to a Court
decision that limited Section 2 to claims of discriminatory intent.67
At first, plaintiffs tackled vote denial in the “first generation” of
voting rights claims.68 These claims covered blatant discrimination that
denied or hindered ballot box access.69 Examples include poll taxes,
grandfather clauses, and literacy tests. But, as with many forms of
discrimination in the modern world, discrimination in the electoral
process did not disappear; it moved underground. This made
intentional discrimination standards harder to prove.70
Later, plaintiffs turned their attention away from outright vote
denial—many forms of which were outlawed by the VRA—to vote
dilution, the “second generation” of voting rights claims, brought
under the VRA. Vote dilution means to weaken the power of
someone’s vote and typically describes the use of election systems to
limit the ability “to translate [a group’s] strength into voting power.”71
Vote dilution is actionable under amended Section 2 and the
Constitution.72 Vote dilution claimants under Section 2 may challenge
any election system that threatens that interest, whether from
districting or election rules.73 For instance, minority communities have
successfully challenged district drawing, called “cracking” and

65. Voting Rights Act, Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 207, 89 Stat. 400, 402
(codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10310(c)(3)).
66. See Voting Rights Act, Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134
(codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301) (adopting a “results” test for Section 2, which looked
to disparate effects rather than discriminatory intent).
67. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43–44 (1986); S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 2 (1982).
68. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of Voting
Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1493, 1498 (2008).
69. Id.
70. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 71–72 (noting that Congress wanted an effects-based, rather than
intent-based, test for Section 2 to ease the burden for claimants).
71. In re Senate Joint Resol. of Legis. Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597, 622 (Fla. 2012);
see also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641 (1993) (describing vote dilution).
72. Crum, Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 6, at 275–77. As Professor
Travis Crum notes, the Court never decided whether vote dilution was actionable under the
Fifteenth Amendment but did find it actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The Court
first held that dilution was unconstitutional in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765–70 (1973).
James U. Blacksher & Larry T. Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden:
Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 22 (1982)
(noting that vote dilution claims were an implication of the one-person-one-vote principle in
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964)).
73. See supra note 20 (examples of challenges to election and districting systems under
Section 2).
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“packing” of election districts.74 In cracking, voters are split up amongst
multiple districts; in packing, they are concentrated in very few
districts.75 The goal of both is to weaken the overall voting power of
those cracked or packed.76
Redistricting suits are those that seek to draw a new district as a
remedy for cracking, packing, or other discriminatory practices. These
claims often involve three types of election systems: single-member
districts, multimember districts, and at-large systems.77 Voters in
single-member districts elect one official for their jurisdiction, whereas
those in multimember districts elect two or more officials for their
district.78 Voters in at-large elections choose representatives to serve
the entire political unit, such as a state, instead of a specified subset,
such as a district.79 The entire constituency elects these officials.80 The
most prominent at-large elections are for U.S. senators and the
president, but they are also often seen at the city council level. At-large
elections typically correlate with decreased minority representation.81
74. See infra note 87 and accompanying text; see also Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1924
(2018) (describing cracking and packing).
75. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1924.
76. See Crum, Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 6, at 269 (explaining how
“politicians can predict that certain redistricting schemes—such as ‘packing’ or ‘cracking’
minority voters . . . will dilute minority voting strength”); see also N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP
v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 222 (4th Cir. 2016) (discussing the powerful incentive of district drawing
to dilute the voting strength of cohesive minority groups).
77. See infra note 87 and accompanying text; see also Frank Adams, Why Legislative Findings
Can Pad-Lock Redistricting Plans in Racial-Gerrymandering Cases, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
1371, 1384 (2006) (discussing redistricting suits involving all three types of election systems).
78. 29 C.J.S. Elections § 82, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2020). Multimember districts
can create representation problems. Imagine three communities of roughly the same size that
could each make their own single-member districts: A, B, and C. If all three are placed in a single
district and given the ability to elect three representatives, and communities B and C vote
together, B and C can elect all three representatives.
79. Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, “At-Large” Elections as Violation of § 2 of Voting Rights
Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C.A. § 1973), 92 A.L.R. FED. 824, § 1(a) n.1 (1989).
80. See Laughlin McDonald, The Quiet Revolution in Minority Voting Rights, 42 VAND. L.
REV. 1249, 1257 (1989) (calling at-large voting “[p]erhaps the preeminent form of vote dilution”).
Additionally, all the seats in an election can be made at-large seats. See id. (“The majority, if it
votes as a bloc, can choose all the officeholders, thereby denying a discrete minority an effective
opportunity to elect any representatives of its choice.”). Alternatively, a jurisdiction can be
separated geographically into single-district elections and then have one or two at-large seats
covering the whole jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hart, et al., supra note 20 (discussing electoral systems
of various Georgia counties).
81. See, e.g., David L. Leal, Valerie Martinez-Ebers & Kenneth J. Meier, The Politics of
Latino Education: The Biases of At-Large Elections, 66 J. POL. 1224, 1241 (2004) (finding a
correlation between at-large elections and Hispanic underrepresentation). As of 1965, 61 percent
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In Georgia, thirty-four counties use at-large elections for all seats,
while one hundred counties use at-large elections for at least one seat.82
In 2013, 60 percent of voters in those at-large contests were White, as
were 92 percent of those elected.83
Plaintiffs typically pursue claims for redistricting under Section 2,
not the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. As noted earlier,
constitutional gerrymandering claims require a showing of intentional
discrimination.84 Because districting lines are facially neutral, plaintiffs
must show that “legitimate districting principles were ‘subordinated’ to
race,” such that race was the predominant factor in legislative
decisionmaking.85 Only then will courts apply strict scrutiny.86 By
contrast, plaintiffs invoking Section 2 can challenge districting claims,
such as cracking and packing, based on discriminatory effects, largely
disassociated from evidence of discriminatory intent.87

of cities with populations of over 5,000 used at-large elections for all of their representatives, INT’L
CITY MANAGERS’ ASS’N, THE MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 118 (1965), and in 2013, that number was
60 percent, INT’L CITY/CNTY. MGMT. ASS’N, THE MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 28 (2013). And, in
1971, less than 1 percent of city council members were from minority groups (Black, Hispanic,
Asian, or Native American), Chandler Davidson & George Korbel, At-Large Elections and
Minority-Group Representation: A Re-Examination of Historical and Contemporary Evidence, 43
J. POL. 982, 982 (1981), whereas now roughly 10 percent are, INT’L CITY/CNTY. MGMT. ASS’N,
2018 MUNICIPAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT SURVEY: SUMMARY OF SURVEY RESULTS 14 (2019).
82. Hart, et al., supra note 20.
83. Id.
84. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1926–29 (2018) (discussing developing standards for
constitutional challenges to politically gerrymandered districting lines); City of Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55, 66–67 (1980) (“The Court explicitly indicated in Washington v. Davis that [the
requirement of discriminatory intent] applies to claims of racial discrimination affecting voting
just as it does to other claims of racial discrimination.”); Gilda R. Daniels, Racial Redistricting in
a Post-Racial World, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 950–51, 951 n.21 (2011) (highlighting a
legislature’s discriminatory intent as differentiating justiciable controversies from political
questions). Racial gerrymandering claims can also be satisfied by “redistricting . . . so extremely
irregular” that it must be race-based. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642, 646–47 (1993). In other
words, intent is implied.
85. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958–59 (1996) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916
(1995)).
86. Id.
87. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 425–26 (2006)
(discussing Gingles requirements, which do not include intent); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S.
30, 34 (1986) (noting that the immediate case involved multimember districts). Districting claims
can include single-member districts (for cracking and packing claims), multimember districts, and
at-large elections. The Court first applied Section 2 to cracking claims in Growe v. Emison, 507
U.S. 25, 40–41 (1993), and packing claims in Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153–54 (1993)
(discussing a claim that plaintiffs were “packed into two districts”). Marylanders for Fair
Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, 849 F. Supp. 1022, 1044 (D. Md. 1994). The favored remedy for
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In the early years after the VRA passed, the Court did not address
whether vote dilution claims under Section 2 required proof of
discriminatory intent or if disparate impact on representation would
suffice.88 During this same period, lower federal courts had developed
standards using a totality-of-the-circumstances test that looked to
disparate effects on minority representation for constitutional claims
of vote dilution—which the Court blessed in 1973 in White v. Regester.89
However, the Court limited Section 2 in 1980 when it decided City of
Mobile v. Bolden,90 a class action challenging the constitutionality of
Mobile’s at-large election for city commissioners.91 The Court stated
that Section 2 merely codified a cause of action coextensive with the
Fifteenth Amendment.92 Because a Fifteenth Amendment claim
requires intent to invalidate a facially neutral statute, so did a claim
under the old Section 2.93 As a result, the Court threw out the plaintiff’s
statutory and constitutional claims.94
However, in 1982, Congress amended Section 2 to clarify that it
applied to the discriminatory effects of vote dilution.95 Congress sought
to undo the Court’s interpretation that stunted the sweep of Section 2
parties challenging districting systems through Section 2 is to create a single-member district
where the minority group constitutes a majority. Growe, 507 U.S. at 40.
88. There was a broader legal debate emerging during the Civil Rights Era of whether the
Reconstruction Amendments protected citizens against governmental actions with discriminatory
effects in addition to those with discriminatory intent. See Cheryl I. Harris, Limiting Equality: The
Divergence and Convergence of Title VII and Equal Protection, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 95, 101–
04 (noting that prior to Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), lower courts routinely applied
disparate impact analysis to equal protection clause claims). This culminated in the Court holding
that discriminatory intent was required for equal protection clause cases. Davis, 426 U.S. at 244–
45.
89. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765–67 (1973) (affirming the district court’s invalidation
of multimember voting districts based on discriminatory history and effects that the district court
had identified and used); see, e.g., Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1304–05 (5th Cir. 1973)
(en banc) (applying the White test to a claim).
90. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
91. Id. at 58 (plurality opinion).
92. Id. at 60–61. At this point, the Court settled on the discriminatory intent standard for the
Reconstruction Amendments. Id. at 62; see also Davis, 426 U.S. at 244–45 (concluding that
“discriminatory racial purpose” is necessary to support an equal protection claim).
93. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 60–62 (plurality opinion).
94. Id. at 61, 65.
95. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 40 (1982). Compare Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub L. No. 89-110,
§ 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (banning procedures used by “any State or political subdivision to deny or
abridge the right . . . to vote on account of race or color”), with 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2018)
(banning procedures employed “in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the
right . . . to vote on account of race or color” (emphasis added)).
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because discriminatory effects perpetuate past discrimination, and
election systems that “operate, designedly or otherwise, to minimize or
cancel out the voting strength . . . of minority groups, are an
impermissible denial of the right to have one’s vote fully count, just as
much as outright denial of access to the ballot box.”96 Congress also
wanted to assist plaintiffs by avoiding the difficulties with proving
intent.97 As currently written, Section 2 declares that a violation occurs:
if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political
processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a
class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have
less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate
in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.98

Although this statement on its face is quite simple, the text leaves
little to guide judicial analysis. Because of the ambiguity of the phrase
“totality of circumstances,” courts turned to the 1982 amendment
Senate Report from the Senate Judiciary Committee for the factors in
their totality of the circumstances analysis.99 The Senate Report
mentions nine nonexhaustive factors, drawn primarily from White and
the pre-Bolden caselaw.100 These factors include considerations of prior
racial polarization in voting, “the extent of any history of official
discrimination . . . that touched the right of the members of the
minority group to register, to vote or to otherwise participate in the
democratic process,” whether the political subdivision has used certain
voting practices (antisingle shot provisions, large election districts, and
so on) that tend to increase the likelihood for discrimination, and to
what degree minority group members have been elected to public
office.101

96. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28, 40–41.
97. Id. at 40.
98. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (emphasis added).
99. E.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35–38, 36 n.4 (1986).
100. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (“While these enumerated factors will often be the most
relevant ones, in some cases other factors will be indicative of the alleged dilution.” (citation
omitted)). The Court thought that this extratextual source was persuasive because these factors
were drawn from caselaw, such as the totality-of-the-circumstances test created in White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), and refined by lower courts, which the Court stated that Congress
wanted to reinstate. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36 n.4 (tracing the factors to White and subsequent
development by lower courts).
101. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (citation omitted).
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The Court addressed the amended Section 2 in 1986 in Gingles.102
After first observing that the 1982 amendment created a results-based
test that effectively overruled Bolden via statute,103 it then crafted
preconditions that must be fulfilled before courts apply the totality-ofthe-circumstances test (the nonexhaustive Senate factors referenced
above).104 First, claimants must show that their community is
“sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority
in a single-member district.”105 Second, claimants must demonstrate
that they are “politically cohesive,” in that they largely vote together.106
Third, claimants must “demonstrate that the white majority votes
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s
preferred candidate.”107 The point of the preconditions is to show that
the election system actually dilutes a minority group’s voting power.108
Thus, the vote dilution claims must meet two independent inquiries:
(1) the three Gingles preconditions, and then (2) whether the totalityof-the-circumstances (including the nonexhaustive Senate Report
factors) demonstrate that the group “ha[s] less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice.”109 Applying this analysis, the
Gingles Court upheld all but one of the lower court’s findings of vote
dilution.110
As Professor Travis Crum puts it, “Gingles boils down to whether
a minority group is residentially segregated and whether there is

102. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 30.
103. Id. at 35.
104. Id. at 48–50. The Senate Report noted three important limitations on Section 2. Id. at 46.
First, no specific type of election system is a per se violation. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 16. Second, a
dilutive device in the mere presence of “the lack of proportional representation” is not a violation.
Id. Finally, the results test does not create a presumption of racial blocs, and the burden of proof
remains on the plaintiffs. Id. at 34.
105. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50.
106. Id. at 51.
107. Id. (noting that this does not apply in unusual circumstances, such as when minorityfavored candidates run unopposed).
108. See id. at 47–51 (“[U]nless there is a conjunction of the [preconditions], the use of
multimember districts generally will not impede the ability . . . to elect representatives . . . .”).
109. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2009) (plurality opinion). This order of
operations for Gingles claims was made clear in Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994), where
it noted that Gingles factors were necessary but not sufficient to state a Section 2 claim. Id. at
1011.
110. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 80.
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racially polarized voting.”111 In other words, the first precondition deals
with segregation issues, while the second and third preconditions deal
with polarized voting. These new inquiries left several ambiguities to
be resolved later.112 Importantly for this Note, the Court then took aim
at resolving what degree of segregation and polarized voting were
necessary for a successful Section 2 claim.113
II. A DISTINCTION WITH A DIFFERENCE: THE LIMITATIONS OF
BARTLETT V. STRICKLAND
With a cause of action and a new test under Section 2, plaintiffs
started to challenge the disparate impact of election policies again, this
time with more innovative claims than the traditional, single-minority
group claims. This Part first describes and outlines the features of two
of these tools—crossover claims and aggregated claims—and how they
work. Then, it outlines the background and rationales underlying the
Bartlett decision, the case that held that crossover claims were not
viable. Finally, it applies the four primary rationales to aggregated
claims and finds that the Bartlett decision does not make those claims
non-viable.
A. Overview of Aggregated and Crossover Claims
Although Gingles addressed claims brought by single-minority
groups and accomplished a great deal of change, a further avenue for
representation under Section 2 is the aggregated claim.114 As one

111. Crum, Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 6, at 279. The Court split
between Justice William Brennan’s plurality opinion and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s
concurrence on whether causation was relevant to this latter issue of racially polarized voting,
also known as racial bloc voting. Under Justice Brennan’s view, the reason why a minority
community or majority bloc vote the way they do is irrelevant to Section 2. Gingles, 478 U.S. at
63–64. Justice O’Connor believed causation did matter for liability. Id. at 100 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Justice Byron White’s concurrence cast confusion over which view
prevailed, viewing the candidate’s race as relevant. Id. at 83 (White, J., concurring).
112. Soon after Gingles, which involved a multimember district claim, the Court extended
Section 2 to cover single-member district claims, such as those alleging cracking and packing.
Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40–41 (1993); see supra note 87; see also Abbott v. Perez, 138 S.
Ct. 2305, 2330–31 (2018) (applying the Gingles test to a challenge to single-member districts drawn
by the Texas Legislature).
113. Crum, Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 6, at 280–81.
114. See Chelsea J. Hopkins, The Minority Coalition’s Burden of Proof Under Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 623, 651–53 (2012) (describing ways that Section 2
claims can be structured to ensure minority representation through aggregation).
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scholar put it, “Much of the growth in [the number of Black elected
officials] during the 1990s can be attributed to the [VRA].”115 However,
the VRA did not cure the lack of representation in government, though
it certainly helped. As a result, aggregated claims may be able to
provide some relief in an increasingly diverse world, where structural
factors and systemic racism will continue to affect both single and
multiple-minority group communities.
Aggregated and crossover claims both involve voter coalitions,
but of different groups. An aggregated claim describes two or more
minority groups that form a politically cohesive community that can
meet the Gingles preconditions and the totality-of-the-circumstances
test.116 The community must be cohesive and vote similarly—with a
majority group voting as a bloc against it—to be viable. Bartlett added
the requirement that the claimants will have to constitute a majority
(50 percent or more) in a new single-member district.117 Thus, an
aggregated claim could be brought by a group that, if successful, would
make a new district that is 44 percent Hispanic and 21 percent Black.118
Alternatively, a group of Black, Hispanic, and Asian voters could
collectively constitute roughly 70 percent of a new district.119 By
contrast, crossover claims by their nature fail Bartlett’s new
requirement. In crossover claims, a minority community constitutes
less than a majority within a redrawn district, but with majority
“crossover” voters—those who vote for minority-preferred
candidates—the minority community can effectively elect their
preferred candidate. An example of a crossover claim might consist of
a Black community, which could form 40 percent of a new district if
drawn.120 That community would then need to demonstrate a reliable
crossover voting effect from majority group members (such as 15 to 20

115. DAVID A. BOSITIS, JOINT CTR. FOR POL. & ECON. STUDIES, BLACK ELECTED
OFFICIALS: A STATISTICAL SUMMARY 12 (2001).
116. Rick G. Strange, Application of Voting Rights Act to Communities Containing Two or
More Minority Groups—When Is the Whole Greater than the Sum of the Parts?, 20 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 95, 111 (1989).
117. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 26 (2009) (plurality opinion).
118. This example is from part of the remedy offered in Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d
1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1988).
119. See DeBaca v. County of San Diego, 794 F. Supp. 990, 997 (S.D. Cal. 1992) (providing an
example of a proposed district “in which African-Americans, Hispanics, and Asian Americans
account[ed] for 73.84% of the total population”).
120. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 46–47 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the math related to
crossover claims).
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percent) in the new district that enabled it to elect its preferred
candidate.121
Prior to Bartlett, crossover claims did not fare well. Virtually every
federal circuit court to encounter crossover claims viewed them as
nonactionable under Section 2.122 By contrast, federal courts treated
aggregated claims, still somewhat controversial, much more
favorably.123 However, as this Note details in Part III, there is a
continuing circuit split over the viability of these claims.124
B. Bartlett: The End of Crossover Claims
Because of the similarity of aggregated and crossover claims, the
Bartlett Court’s prohibition of the latter introduces complications for
the former. The Bartlett Court’s treatment of crossover claims,
however, illuminates the differences between the two types of claims.
This Section elaborates on those differences and highlights why
aggregated claims are not precluded under Section 2.
The controversy in Bartlett started with census redistricting in the
state of North Carolina. In 2006, a three-judge panel in Wake County
upheld the state’s redistricting plan passed by the North Carolina
General Assembly in 2003 against a challenge alleging that the plan
violated the North Carolina Constitution’s Whole County Provision
(“WCP”).125 The WCP requires the legislature to draw state senate and
house districts without dividing counties, unless in conflict with federal
law.126 Based on census data, each North Carolina House district would
have contained 67,078 North Carolinians.127

121. See id. As noted in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548
U.S. 399, 445 (2006), Section 2 does not require the creation of “influence” districts, where
minority groups cannot elect their preferred candidate but can influence the outcome of an
election.
122. See Pender Cnty. v. Bartlett, 649 S.E.2d 364, 372 (N.C. 2007) (summarizing circuit court
decisions).
123. See infra Part III.
124. See infra Part III.
125. Pender Cnty., 649 S.E.2d at 366, 368.
126. Id. at 367; N.C. CONST. art. II, §§ 3(3), 5(3).
127. Pender Cnty., 649 S.E.2d at 366.
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FIGURE 1. THE HOUSE REDISTRICTING PLAN FOR 2003, WITH A VIEW
OF THE PENDER-NEW HANOVER SPLIT128

Aside from its obligation to redistrict under the census,129 the
legislature was also concerned with Section 2, which it believed
required the creation of crossover districts.130 Thus, the legislature
created District 18 as a crossover district with a voting-age population

128. HOUSE REDISTRICTING PLAN, N.C. GENERAL ASSEMBLY (2003), https://www.ncleg.gov/
Files/GIS/Plans_Main/House_2003/mapSimple.pdf [https://perma.cc/8G57-EHSN] (map coloration,
text color, and district line thickness altered to enhance viewability).
129. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
130. Pender Cnty., 649 S.E.2d at 374; see Stephenson v. Bartlett (Stephenson I), 562 S.E.2d
377, 396–97 (N.C. 2002) (holding that the state legislature must draw districts in compliance with
the VRA and not wait for litigation).
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that was 39.36 percent Black.131 To create a district with this minority
population, the legislature created three districts by splitting Pender
County, with a population of 41,082, and combining it with its neighbor
to the south, New Hanover County, with a population of 160,307.132
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the Wake County court,
stating that federal law did not require crossover districts in the first
instance because Section 2 did not allow crossover claims in afterdistricting litigation.133 It relied on the fact that most federal circuit
courts had rejected crossover claims because the minority did not
constitute a majority in a redrawn district.134 Accordingly, the
districting plan violated the North Carolina Constitution because it
lacked federal justification for deviating from the WCP.135
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,136 and
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for the plurality, which held that
Section 2 does not authorize crossover claims.137 In rejecting crossover
claims, the plurality clarified that the first Gingles precondition,
originally phrased as requiring a “sufficiently large and contiguous”
minority population “to constitute effective voting majorities in singlemember districts,” requires a community that will constitute a
majority.138 In so holding, the plurality provided four rationales.139 First,
crossover districts are inconsistent with the Gingles preconditions
because the first precondition requires that the minority population
constitute a majority within a new single-member district, and because
the White voting bloc—an integral part of dilution—is breaking

131. Pender Cnty., 649 S.E.2d at 366–67. Courts generally use voting-age population
(“VAP”), instead of general population. Id. at 370. Data showed a Black general population of
41.54 percent, or VAP of 38.37 percent, was needed for a crossover district, and District 18 was
42.89 percent Black with a 39.36 percent Black VAP. Id. at 367.
132. Id. at 366.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 372–74.
135. Id. at 375.
136. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 1 (2009) (plurality opinion).
137. Id. at 14. Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia argued that Section 2 does not
authorize any vote dilution claim, id. at 26 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment), while four
dissenting Justices believed that crossover claims were viable under Section 2, id. at 26–27 (Souter,
J., dissenting); id. at 44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Weinberg,
supra note 30, at 427 n.123 (summarizing the arguments put forward by the Bartlett dissenters and
other commentators in favor of recognizing crossover or aggregated claims under Section 2).
138. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 15–20 (plurality opinion).
139. See id. at 14–23 (providing various arguments against crossover claims).
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down.140 Although what “sufficiently large” meant under the first
precondition had been somewhat unclear before, the plurality set a
hard-and-fast rule that the minority community must make up at least
50 percent in a new district.141 And the Gingles line of cases always
framed the Section 2 inquiry as whether minority groups possess “the
potential to elect representatives in the absence of the challenged
structure.”142 In the plurality’s view, the minority’s choice is distinct
from the choice of the coalition of minority and crossover voters.143
Thus, “the potential to elect representatives” means the ability of the
community to constitute a majority within a new single-member
district.144
Second, crossover claims were “contrary to the mandate of
[Section] 2,” which only guarantees an “equal” opportunity to elect
one’s representatives of choice and requires groups to pull political
weight.145 The claimants were “no better or worse” in terms of their
“opportunity to elect a candidate than . . . any other group of voters.”146
Only if minorities could constitute a majority within their own singlemember district but were unable to elect a candidate would they have
less opportunity.147 Minorities must do what all other voters do—argue,
debate, and convince others to vote for their candidates.148 In other
words, Section 2 does not guarantee heightened political strength by
guaranteeing new districts based on purely political coalitions.149
Third, increased racial considerations associated with crossover
claims might run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.150
Constitutional avoidance required an interpretation of Section 2 that
avoids racial considerations, which are to be used only as a last resort.151
140. Id. at 15–16, 19–20.
141. Id. at 16–19.
142. Id. at 15 (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 n.17 (1986)).
143. Id.
144. Id. (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n.17).
145. Id. at 14–15, 20.
146. Id. at 14.
147. Id. at 15.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 14–15 (“Nothing in § 2 grants special protection to a minority group’s right to
form political coalitions.”).
150. Id. at 21.
151. Id. (“To the extent there is any doubt whether § 2 calls for the majority-minority rule, we
resolve that doubt by avoiding serious constitutional concerns under the Equal Protection
Clause.”).
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Mandating crossover districts would “unnecessarily infuse race into
virtually every redistricting.”152 Thus, the plurality wanted to avoid the
intensity and frequency of the racial considerations that crossover
claims would introduce into the courts.153 But this does not preclude
any accounting of race, which is tantamount to holding Section 2
unconstitutional. And the plurality stated that “racial discrimination
and racially polarized voting are not ancient history,” as work on issues
of race “remains to be done.”154 This means that while racial
considerations are not per se illicit in legislation, an interpretation that
introduces too much racialization into the districting processes and
subsequent litigation is probably off the table. Crossover districts
crossed that line.
Finally, while Section 2 ensures equal opportunity, crossover
districts instead emphasize racial distinctions instead of progressing
toward the “waning of racism.”155 Thus, permitting crossover claims
means that Section 2 would require the cementing of certain
developments of racial or ethnic solidarity, instead of the natural
evolution of unity. Although the VRA was meant to encourage unity
and solidarity, the plurality said the VRA was not meant to require this
behavior “by force of law.”156
C. Why Bartlett Is Not the End of Aggregated Claims
Because of the Court’s analysis, however, and the relation
between crossover claims and aggregated claims, many scholars
thought that Bartlett foreclosed the latter claims completely.157 But not
only are crossover claims distinguishable from aggregated claims for a

152. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC),
548 U.S. 399, 446 (2006) (opinion of Kennedy, J.)).
153. See id. at 22 (“Disregarding the majority-minority rule and relying on a combination of
race and party . . . would involve the law and courts in a perilous enterprise.”).
154. Id. at 25.
155. Id. (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994)).
156. Id. at 25–26.
157. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Further, in 2012, the Court handed down Perry
v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388 (2012), which contained the language, “If the District Court did set out to
create a minority coalition district . . . it had no basis for doing so,” and cited to Bartlett with a
“cf.” signal. Id. at 399. This alone does not evince an opinion as to the efficacy of aggregated
claims, as it does not address the issue fully, and the dissenters in Bartlett signed onto the per
curiam opinion. See Weinberg, supra note 30, at 430 (noting that “it is unlikely that the Perry
Court intended to resolve whether Section 2 requires the creation of coalition districts in such a
cryptic fashion”).
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number of reasons, this Section argues that aggregated claims are
largely consistent with the four primary rationales enumerated in
Bartlett and that aggregated claims are still permitted under Section 2.
1. Crossover Claims and Inconsistencies with Gingles. In Bartlett,
the plurality focused on how the first and third Gingles preconditions
are at odds with crossover claims. Crossover districts by their very
nature represent the result that the VRA was meant to foster—people
work together despite their differences and minority groups have a
“potential to elect” their desired representatives.158 By contrast,
aggregated claims address the same worries regarding discrimination
that motivated the passage of Section 2, but they involve more than
one minority group. Aggregated claims also lack the bloc-breaking by
the majority that is present in crossover claims. Although aggregated
claims embody the falling of some barriers (between minority groups),
the relevant barrier for the purpose of Section 2 is between the
majority bloc and the minority communities.159
Importantly, crossover districts fail the first Gingles
precondition—meaning that the minority community does not
constitute a majority within a single-member district if it must rely on
crossover voters to elect its representatives.160 This is because, to the
Bartlett plurality, the minority’s choice of representative is distinct
from the choice of the coalition of the minority and crossover voters.161
The crossover coalition then has the strength to elect representatives
of the coalition’s choice, but the more entangled the minority group
becomes with the majority, the less power the minority community has
in its own right.162 By contrast, aggregated claimants can meet the
majority requirement because the relevant community is composed of
two or more minority groups, which assert that their preferences are
being defeated by a majority voting bloc as the result of a
discriminatory election system. Although both claims feature a type of
158. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 14–16 (plurality opinion) (noting, for crossover claims, that
majority voting blocs are breaking down and that there is evidence of increasing racial unity).
159. See id. at 16 (emphasizing that allowing crossover claims under Section 2 “would create
serious tension with the third Gingles requirement that the majority votes as a bloc”).
160. If it could, the minority community would simply bring the claim on its own.
161. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 15 (plurality opinion) (“There is a difference between a racial
minority group’s ‘own choice’ and the choice made by a coalition.”).
162. See id. at 16 (noting that, as crossover effects increase, the strength of majority bloc
voting wanes, and as a result of crossover voting the direct power of the minority group
unconnected from the coalitional power with crossover voters also will lessen)..
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“coalition,” the third Gingles precondition highlights why these groups
are different.
Crossover claims also conflict with the third Gingles precondition
because the White voting bloc, an integral part of the dilution of
minority voting power, is breaking down.163 This factor is extremely
important, because crossover voting most directly affects the racially
polarized voting inquiry of Gingles (which is composed of the first two
preconditions). The Court brought this tension up despite the fact that
the parties stipulated that the third precondition had been met—showing
just how important this was to the plurality.164 And, aggregated groups
are the most clearly distinguishable on these grounds. Crossover voting
by its nature represents a type of bloc breaking.165 The type of voting
patterns alleged in viable aggregated claims do not show these types of
bloc-breaking patterns. Indeed, aggregated communities, like singleminority group communities, face similar opposition from a strong
majority voting bloc. And, aggregated communities can show that their
voting power is diluted, just like single-minority group communities
can. This “serious tension” with the third Gingles precondition is what
makes crossover claims, in the eyes of the Bartlett plurality, “political
coalitions,” and this same logic means that aggregated claims are
something else.166
Further, aggregated claims align with the purposes of Gingles
gatekeeping function—that the preconditions screen out claims that
are not based in discrimination (or at least highly unlikely to be the
result of discrimination). The Bartlett Court’s reasoning that crossover
voters represent a “breaking down” of racial or ethnic barriers tracks
with Justice John Paul Stevens’s views on affirmative action and
inferring discrimination.167 Justice Stevens had a view of equal
protection that lies in the vein of the antisubordination principle.168
163. Id.
164. Id.; Crum, Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 6, at 281.
165. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 16 (plurality opinion) (stating that “by definition,” crossover
voting means that “white voters join in sufficient numbers with minority voters to elect the
minority’s preferred candidate”).
166. Id. at 15–16.
167. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 247 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“[A] decision by representatives of the majority to discriminate against the members of a
minority race is fundamentally different from those same representatives’ decision to impose
incidental costs on the majority . . . to provide a benefit to a disadvantaged minority.”).
168. See id. at 247–48 & n.5 (“[A] decision by representatives of the majority to discriminate
against the members of a minority race is fundamentally different from those same
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Because it is rare, if at all, that a majority would harm its own race
intentionally, Justice Stevens believed that legislation that benefited
minority groups at the expense of the majority is likely not racial
discrimination, or at the very least only benign discrimination.169 Why
after all, would politicians attempt to subjugate a majority of their
constituents?170 If this is true, the majority bloc’s actions—if also taken
against crossover voters of the same race and ethnicity—are less likely
to be discriminatory. More likely, these voters legitimately disagree
with the coalition’s candidate.171 By contrast, in aggregated claims, the
voters are racially or ethnically polarized, which supports the inference
that this polarization reflects voting against minority interests.172 After
all, Section 2 is a tool to measure oppression by a majority.173 And this
emphasis on voting polarization makes sense because two of the three
preconditions explicitly focus on polarization.174 These preconditions
keep out claims that courts can assume will not (or should not) succeed
in fulfilling the purposes of Section 2. But, because aggregated groups
meet both the letter and logic of Gingles, courts should not bar
aggregated claims.
representatives’ decision to impose incidental costs on the majority of their constitutes in order
to provide a benefit to a disadvantaged minority.”).
169. Id.; see also Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 16 (plurality opinion) (implying that there may be less
racially polarized voting because many crossover voters, who are defecting from the majority
voting bloc, are voting for minority voter interests).
170. Justice Stevens’ view on antisubordination can be seen particularly clearly in his sparring
with Justice Thomas in Adarand,
I would not find Justice THOMAS’ extreme proposition—that there is a moral and
constitutional equivalence between an attempt to subjugate and an attempt to redress
the effects of a caste system—at all persuasive. It is one thing to question the wisdom
of affirmative-action programs . . . . It is another thing altogether to equate the many
well-meaning and intelligent lawmakers and their constituents—whether members of
majority or minority races—who have supported affirmative action over the years, to
segregationists and bigots.
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 247 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
171. The underlying reasons for polarized voting are irrelevant. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30, 67, 70–71 (1986) (rejecting the requirement “that the discriminatory intent of individual
white voters must be proved in order to make out a § 2 claim”).
172. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 247–48 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A] decision by
representatives of the majority to discriminate against the members of a minority race is
fundamentally different from those same representatives’ decision to impose incidental costs on
the majority of their constituents in order to provide a benefit to a disadvantaged minority.”).
173. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 43–44 (noting that in order to determine a violation of § 2 “a
court must assess the impact of the contested structure or practice on minority electoral
opportunities”).
174. The second Gingles precondition considers the cohesiveness of the minority community,
and the third precondition reviews the presence of a strong majority voting bloc. Id. at 51.
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Moreover, the requirement that minorities make up a majority
within a redrawn district is partially the result of administrability and
judicial resource concerns.175 Crossover claims do not implicate this
interest because they suggest the existence of racial or ethnic unity that
Section 2 was designed to foster, without the assistance of the courts.176
Thus, it is more efficient to let those claims go and focus scarce judicial
resources on those that more strongly implicate the antidiscrimination
purpose of Section 2. In Bartlett, District 18’s Black voting-age
population would have fallen from 39.36 percent to 35.33 percent had
Pender County stayed whole.177 This minimal change, paired with
significant crossover voting, likely did not justify an application of
Section 2, though the Court did not explicitly state this. Additionally,
this bright-line rule makes judicial administration easier by avoiding
the measurement of an unknown variable of crossover voting.178 The
same is not true in aggregated claims. Aggregated claims can meet the
Gingles preconditions and maintain the Court’s bright-line rules.179 For
example, an aggregated claim could be composed of a group of 60
percent Black voters and 40 percent Hispanic voters, who make up
over 50 percent of the voting population in a newly drawn singlemember district, suffer from a history of majority bloc voting, and vote
cohesively together, thus satisfying the Gingles preconditions. And
aggregated claims represent voting polarization and discrimination
similar to single-minority group claims and are therefore worthy of the
same protection.
2. The New Section 2 Mandate: Limits on Political, not Permissible,
Coalitions. In addition to concerns about the Gingles framework, the
Bartlett Court also moved to limit the “mandate” of Section 2.180 The
Court originally interpreted the mandate as broad, flexibly prohibiting

175. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 17 (2009) (plurality opinion) (“We find support for the
majority-minority requirement in the need for workable standards and sound judicial and
legislative administration . . . . The same cannot be said of a less exacting standard that would
mandate crossover districts under § 2.”).
176. Id. at 25.
177. Id. at 8.
178. Id. at 17.
179. Id. at 14; Ho, supra note 29, at 432.
180. See Drecun, supra note 30, at 125–26 (“That Justice Kennedy perceived [the state
officials’] decision to pursue [the retention of the minority group’s voting strength] as contrary to
the law’s mandate is a measure of how the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the VRA has
changed across time.”).
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all election systems that “operate to minimize or cancel out the voting
strength of [minorities in] the voting population.”181 The Court
attacked vote dilution that was effectuated through discriminatory
districting schemes by first prohibiting multimember districts, then
expanding it to single-member districts, and extending Section 2’s
coverage to judicial elections.182 Lower courts have also expansively
read the VRA to target voter identification laws, restrictive
registration processes, and inequitable access to polling places.183 By
contrast, the Bartlett plurality stated that preserving minority gains in
districting ran contrary to the mandate of Section 2, because the VRA
was not meant to hand out political advantages.184 It is a protection
from “political famine,” not a guarantee of “a political feast.”185
Applying this logic, crossover claims fare no better or worse than other
political groups trying to elect their candidate by forming coalitions.186
Thus, the Court saw Section 2 as creating a distinction between
political coalitions and permissible coalitions. However, both the
limiting principle of Bartlett and the nature of crossover claims counsel
against labeling aggregated claims as merely political coalitions.
Although the plurality did not want lower courts to entangle
themselves in politics, the Court did not preclude single-minority group
claims, meaning these groups do not impermissibly introduce political

181. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47–48 (1986) (alteration in original) (quoting Burns
v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966)). In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), the
Court focused heavily on Congress’s purpose to tackle “insidious and pervasive evil,” filled with
“obstructionist tactics” that had reared their head in “unremitting and ingenious defiance.” Id. at
309, 328; Drecun, supra note 30, at 125.
182. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40–42 (1993) (applying Section 2 to single-member district
“cracking” claims); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153–54 (1993) (single-member district
“packing” claims); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (judicial elections). As the Fourth
Circuit noted, expansions outside of vote dilution have been rare, primarily due to Section 4(b)
and 5’s preclearance scheme that was struck down in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529
(2013). See League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 239 (4th Cir. 2014)
(“[T]he predominance of vote dilution in Section 2 jurisprudence likely stems from the
effectiveness of the now-defunct Section 5 preclearance requirements that stopped would-be vote
denial from occurring in covered jurisdictions like large parts of North Carolina.”).
183. League of Women Voters of N.C., 769 F.3d at 239, 244–45 (giving examples of where
Section 2 had been used to target vote denial, and then applying Section 2 to a law eliminating
same-day voter registration and out-of-precinct voting).
184. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 14–15, 20, 25–26 (plurality opinion) (noting that Section 2 was
not meant to require “by force of law” the racial and ethnic unity that it was meant to inspire).
185. Id. at 16.
186. Id. at 14.
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considerations into lower courts’ analysis.187 This is the limiting
principle of Bartlett. And even for single-minority group claims, some
political tie and analysis are necessary to show a lack of opportunity for
representation. Indeed, the second Gingles precondition is that the
relevant community is politically cohesive enough. Thus, mere
consideration of politics should not automatically bar aggregated
claims. And from the standpoint of political entanglement of different
coalitions, it seems difficult to distinguish a coalition from a singleminority group and a coalition formed from members of two or more
minority groups.
Additionally, aggregated claims are also distinct in appearance
from crossover claims. First, crossover voting resembles general,
nonracialized political activity: groups bonding over a political goal.188
Again, (usually White) crossover voters are not part of the claim and
do not purport to be direct victims of discrimination on the basis of
minority status.189 By contrast, aggregated claimants can and do allege
such discrimination. And while aggregated claims result from a
merging of groups, these are two minority groups—the type of groups
that Section 2 protects from unlawful barriers in voting. At its core, the
aggregated community’s tie is one of common discrimination, not
common politics.
More importantly, perhaps, crossover claims have no limiting
principle. What percentage of a single-member district should be able
to sustain a crossover claim? In Bartlett, minorities constituted roughly
36 percent of the redrawn district. What about 25 percent? 10 percent?
Even Justice David Souter in his dissent said that as time goes on, the
size of the minority in the new single-member district will decrease
because crossover voters will increase as voting blocs break down.190
Eventually, these voting patterns start to look like political actors
working together. However, once crossover claims are barred—where

187. See id. at 17 (noting that crossover claims require courts to engage in political inquiries
ill-suited for the judiciary).
188. See id. at 14–15 (“Recognizing a [Section] 2 claim in this circumstance would grant
minority voters ‘a right to preserve their strength for the purposes of forging an advantageous
political alliance.’”).
189. Although it is true that crossover voters are indirectly affected by discriminatory
behavior, this incidental discrimination that they suffer is exactly the kind of injury the Bartlett
Court wanted to prevent redress for. See id. at 15–16 (noting that the crossover voters suffer from
political injury, as opposed to one that is cognizable under Section 2).
190. Id. at 33 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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the likely uniting factor is political—application of the Gingles
preconditions and totality-of-the-circumstances test ensures that
Section 2 vindicates claims that combat discriminatory effects, not
claims that represent political association.
Finally, the suggestive language about opportunities of minority
voters in Bartlett is misleading. Indeed, aggregated communities could
represent the result of an “opportunity to join other voters—including
other racial minorities, or whites, or both—to reach a majority.”191 But
the Court’s point is that in crossover claims, minority groups can join
with other groups to elect their representatives without Section 2.192 At
any rate, this concern mirrors the Court’s concerns about the breaking
down of bloc voting.193 By contrast, when an aggregated community
meets the Gingles preconditions, including a showing of minority
cohesion and electoral losses because of a majority voting bloc, barriers
in the electoral process prevent its members from joining with others
to achieve electoral success.194 The mere ability to join in coalitions
with others is not enough, and it was never enough under Section 2.
Because aggregated claims embody protection against “political
famine,” while not representing the “political feast” of crossover
claims, the political considerations argument applies with less force.195
3. Crossover Coalitions Create Unnecessary Infusions of Race. The
political considerations in Bartlett were arguably overshadowed by the
concerns over racial considerations being injected into the judicial
process.196 Mere considerations of race, however, cannot explain the

191. Id. at 14 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added); see Weinberg, supra note 30, at 426
(noting how minorities joining together would form “political coalitions” in the Bartlett Court’s
view).
192. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 14 (plurality opinion) (emphasizing that Black voters “standing
alone have no better or worse opportunity to elect a candidate than does any other group of
voters”).
193. See id. at 16 (noting the tension with the focus of Gingles on racial bloc voting where
White crossover voters are the reason why minority voters could win). See supra Part II.B.i for a
response.
194. See Drecun, supra note 30, at 131 (arguing that electoral barriers for minority voters are
linked to their minority status).
195. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 16–17 (plurality opinion) (noting that crossover claims represent
a political feast because they allow heightened protection for political coalitions).
196. Though not every Section 2 case involves questions exclusively about race, such as where
ethnic minorities are involved, the Court generally treats ethnic discrimination the same as racial
discrimination for equal protection purposes. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
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result in Bartlett because this would mean the end of all Section 2
claims. Even single-minority group claims can account for racial
percentages, racial divisions in voting, and histories of racial
discrimination.197 However, the frequency and intensity of racial
considerations were concerns made apparent from the statement that
crossover claims would “unnecessarily infuse race into virtually every
redistricting.”198 The term “unnecessarily” implies an intensity
problem. And the phrase “virtually every” poses a frequency problem.
But neither dooms aggregated claims.
As for frequency, crossover districts are ostensibly more likely to
occur than aggregated districts. This is because crossover claims allow
a minority group to constitute less than a majority within a redrawn
district and still succeed on a Section 2 claim. In a White-majority
nation, there are always enough White voters to find. Even in diverse
states, one can find White and minority populations sufficient to
plausibly form crossover claims more often than one can find two
different minority populations able to support aggregated claims. For
instance, in North Carolina, the number of potential crossover
districts—with White voters and either Hispanic or Black voters—that
can be drawn within each county based on census data is higher than
the potential number of aggregated districts with Black–Hispanic
aggregated communities.199 Though this example has limited

267, 273 (1986) (“Decisions by faculties and administrators of public schools based on race or
ethnic origin are reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
197. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 36–37, 51 (1986). For a discussion of the historical
evidence regarding the original understanding of race and the Fifteenth Amendment, see Crum,
Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 6, at 305–11. Needless to say, new swaths of
empowered Black voters during Reconstruction garnered the political victories necessary to pass
the Fifteenth Amendment, and much of this history seems at odds with some of the modern views
on colorblindness as a constitutional requirement. But, given the trend of the Court’s
jurisprudence, scholars need to grapple with the fact that colorblindness, even if historically
flawed, is not going anywhere. Thus, any theory of aggregated claims will have to fit within
Bartlett’s framework for the VRA and Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
198. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 21 (emphasis added) (plurality opinion).
199. See generally NORTH CAROLINA 2010 SUMMARY, supra note 19 (summarizing 2010
census data for North Carolina counties by race). This illustration of hypothetical claims in North
Carolina relied on the census data for populations of North Carolina counties. Using this, this
Note determined, within each county, how many North Carolina General Assembly House
crossover or aggregated districts could theoretically be created from population sizes as of 2010,
assuming that each House district has a population of roughly 75,000. Assuming crossover voting
is effective with a minority population of 35 percent of a new district, each crossover district would
need to have 26,250 minorities (either Black or Hispanic voters). Aggregated districts would
require a minority community (Black and Hispanic voters) with at least 37,500 individuals, or 50
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explanatory power, it supports the intuition that crossover claims are
more likely to occur than aggregated claims.200
Second, the assumption that because multiple races are involved,
aggregated claims feature a heightened intensity of racial
considerations is dubious for several reasons. First, aggregation results
in less hairsplitting over race than crossover claims.201 Crossover claims
involve the precise measure of a constantly fluctuating variable of
crossover voting, which requires courts to engage in a panoply of racebased assumptions.202 This added question—how many crossover
voters there are—is the key distinction.203 The questions that
aggregated claims raise are not as problematic: Are the claimants
minorities, and do the claimant communities meet the Section 2
requirements? For aggregated claims, there is no endless list of factors
that makes a person a certain race or language minority, even if
cohesiveness and geographic compactness of the relevant community
may change the outcome of litigation.
Further, disallowing aggregation creates more racial
considerations.204 If required to gatekeep all aggregated claims, courts
will account more for race205—not less—out of the need to classify
claimants based on their races or ethnicities to determine their
eligibility for a remedy.206 This contradicts the Court’s understanding
percent of the new district. As a result, potential crossover districts are more possible, with fiftyfour potential crossovers districts as opposed to forty potential aggregated districts. Still, this
illustration is limited and does not inquire into whether these groups are of voting age or meet
the Gingles preconditions. And it forecloses cross-county districts, though the intracounty analysis
makes some sense because of the WCP.
200. The fact that fewer circuits have addressed aggregated claims than crossover claims also
provides support for this claim. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 19 (plurality opinion) (noting that the
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits declined to allow crossover claims); infra
notes 236–36 and accompanying text (noting that only the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh
Circuits have squarely addressed aggregated claims).
201. Ho, supra note 29, at 432–33.
202. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 17, 22–23 (plurality opinion) (emphasizing that crossover claims
require courts to both ask questions “that even experienced polling analysts and political experts”
cannot answer, and make race-based assumptions about voting patterns).
203. See id. at 17, 21–22 (describing the question of crossover voting as a “racial measure”
that should be avoided).
204. See Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1399 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Keith, J.,
dissenting) (“The majority, today, segregates the Black and Hispanic beneficiaries of Voting
Rights Act protection solely on the basis of race.”).
205. See id.
206. Id.; see also Ben Boris, Note, The VRA at a Crossroads: The Ability of Section 2 To
Address Discriminatory Districting on the Eve of the 2020 Census, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2093,
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of the Reconstruction Amendments as barring all but necessary
considerations of race.207 Moreover, this belies the Bartlett plurality’s
understanding of “unnecessary” racial considerations. The existence of
crossover voting means that a significant portion of majority voters are
comfortable with increasing diversity and, therefore, that Section 2 is
unneeded. By contrast, an aggregated community’s voting power in a
successful claim is diluted due to minority status by a majority voting
bloc.
Further, in support of their view that aggregated claims are
unwise, scholars like Professor Abigail Thernstrom believe that
aggregation and all majority-minority redistricting treat minorities as
fungible—that these voters all have the same views, interests, and are
simply interchangeable (and that minority candidates are unable to
compete in today’s modern pluralistic elective world).208 Such
treatment also ostensibly violates the Court’s command not to assume
that all minorities think alike.209 However, contrary to Thernstrom’s
view, aggregation showcases a better understanding of racial
complexities. Thernstrom’s conclusion results in treating people only
as their race. In other words, courts denying aggregation essentially say
that a minority’s views inhere with their race or ethnicity and that these
views are fundamentally divergent.210 This is also a race-based

2111 (2020) (“Under the logic of the Nixon majority, a plaintiff class would have to be racially
‘pure.’ This would prove increasingly unworkable in light of the demographic changes mentioned
above.”).
207. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922 (1995) (noting that laws classifying citizens on
the basis of race are presumptively unconstitutional).
208. Abigail Thernstrom, Redistricting in Today’s Shifting Racial Landscape, 23 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 373, 383, 400–02 (2012) (“[I]n much civil rights literature, it was assumed that
members of minority groups were fungible—that all non-White Americans had the same
interests.”); see also Geraci, supra note 29, at 407 (stating that multiracial coalitions risk “treating
[minority group members] as fungible commodities”). But see Hopkins, supra note 114, at 645
(noting that cohesion testing can alleviate some issues of treating minorities as fungible). Still,
most circuits hold that a minority-preferred candidate need not be of the minority community’s
race or ethnicity. See ELLEN KATZ, VOTING RTS. INITIATIVE, DOCUMENTING DISCRIMINATION
IN VOTING: JUDICIAL FINDINGS UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT SINCE 1982 at
64 n.139, 65 n.141 (2005) (collecting caselaw). Thus, the issue is not so much an assumption of
whether minority candidates can compete in a White-majority district contest (in a nation fastmoving demographically anyway), but whether minority communities can effectively achieve
representation and policy goals, in a nation with a representative democracy where voting power
is supposed to be relatively equal.
209. Miller, 515 U.S. at 911–12.
210. Drecun, supra note 30, at 137.
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assumption of the type that the Bartlett plurality wanted to minimize.211
However, this is not to say that aggregation has no risks. It does. But
that is precisely why the preconditions and a totality-of-thecircumstances test exist—to see where discrimination, not merely
political coalition building, is taking place. That, after all, is the heart
of Bartlett. Forbidding aggregation, in some part, denies that minorities
can think outside the bounds of their race, ethnicity, or culture.212
Likewise, Thernstrom’s view assumes that minorities are discrete,
incapable of allying with other minority groups and sharing a common
or parallel history of discrimination.213 However, as one author notes,
congressional intent inherently aggregates certain groups together—
most clearly seen in the case of language minorities under Section 2.214
And to think that Chinese, Japanese, Thai, Filipino and Asian Indian
Americans can be aggregated as language minorities implicitly assumes
enough potential similarity—likely in the form of common
discrimination—to aggregate.215 Why not all groups, then, who are
often “othered” and treated as the same, or discriminated against
collectively by White majorities? And this argument undercuts the
assertion that aggregation impermissibly treats minority groups as
interchangeable. Arguably, if large portions (though obviously not all)
minorities share common views because of a history of similar
discrimination, it is hard to see how aggregation makes them fungible.
Their views are not performative or linked to their race for race’s sake,
but the product of a long and storied history of oppression.
Aggregation thus promotes views and the representation of those
disadvantaged groups.

211. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 911–12 (noting the offensive assumption, in race-based districting,
that minorities “think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates
at the polls”).
212. See Boris, supra note 206, at 2110–11 (“Under the logic of the Nixon majority, a plaintiff
class would have to be racially ‘pure.’”); Drecun, supra note 30, at 137 (“To bar [aggregated]
claims categorically . . . would hold that racial identification signifies immutable differences
between minority groups.”).
213. Common histories of discrimination may not be necessary—indeed it may be enough to
show that they are discriminated against together, even if in different ways. Drecun, supra note
30, at 136; Schulte, supra note 29, at 472–75. In either scenario, discrimination operates invidiously
against both groups concurrently, even if in invariable and indiscriminate ways, precisely the type
of evasive and indeterminate inequity the VRA is aimed to stop.
214. Sette, supra note 29, at 2728.
215. See 52 U.S.C. § 10503(e) (2018) (defining “language minority group” as “persons who
are American Indian, Asian American, Alaskan Natives, or of Spanish heritage”).
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On balance, treating minorities as demarcated boxes is worse than
allowing a small amount of fungibility in aggregation.216 Section 2
already allows some fungibility within the single-minority group claims
because minority voters who vote the same way are interchangeable in
the analysis.217 If one takes the view that fungibility is a deadly problem,
then one might have to undo Section 2 altogether. Further, Gingles
assists with the fungibility point—because voters must be cohesive and
face a majority voting bloc. And the totality-of-the-circumstances test
relies heavily on evidence of implicit or explicit discrimination. These
will likely help courts root out invidious discrimination, even if it faces
two or more groups. And doctrinally, while Gingles’ political cohesion
requirement makes voters within each minority group fungible if they
vote cohesively, it does not tell courts to separate these groups
arbitrarily—that is, to forbid aggregation.218
Moreover, America’s increasingly pluralistic nature shows that
disallowing aggregation would undermine the use of Section 2 as an
important tool to eradicate voting discrimination because “racial
discrimination and racially polarized voting are not ancient history.”219
Racism in election systems will be able to not just survive but thrive as
diversity increases, because the eroding majority can dilute minority
voting power as long as it happens against multiple minority groups.220
The growing diversity of our nation will thus make it easier to hide
discriminatory districting, if aggregated claims are not permitted. And
the opposition to aggregation has no answer for how to address
biraciality and biethnicity.221 Are these people classified as the group
they primarily identify with, or are they given no remedy at all? Courts
addressing one or more communities with biracial or biethnic members
face the task of either considering difficult racial and ethnic
complexities or unconstitutionally denying rights based on race or
ethnicity. Disallowing this is another form of essentialism—the
assumption that all members in a group will act or think in a given way.

216. Ho, supra note 29, at 432–33.
217. See id. at 433 (“But such concerns . . . are also present in § 2 claims brought on behalf of
voters from a single minority group.”).
218. Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1399 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Keith, J., dissenting).
219. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 25 (2009) (plurality opinion).
220. Moreover, aggregation embodies a more realistic view of race. Communities will often
be discriminated against as a whole rather than simply their Black, Asian, or Hispanic portions.
221. See Boris, supra note 206, at 2110–11 (illustrating the problems with classifying voters of
mixed-race or mixed-ethnicity backgrounds).
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As one student scholar notes, trying to determine racial “purity” sets
courts down a dark path.222 Although the crossover claims in Bartlett
implicated an offensive assumption about minority group members,
prohibiting aggregation implies two offensive assumptions: that
minority group members all think alike within their groups, and that
minority groups are perfectly separable.223
Admittedly, significant racial and political considerations can be
problematic, but some must be allowed because single-minority group
claims involve both.224 Crossover claims necessarily entail more
considerations of race and politics than single-minority group claims.225
However, aggregated claims do not necessarily require courts to
become as deeply entangled in racial and political considerations as
crossover claims require. At some level, the allowable amount of race
and politics is a judgment call. Aggregated claims may involve more
political considerations than single-minority group claims but have
similarly significant racial considerations.226 More importantly,
aggregated claims do not implicate many of the racial and political
problems that plague crossover claims, because aggregated claimants
do not look outside of the community claiming discrimination for the
success of their claim. Thus, aggregated claims are not foreclosed by
this argument in Bartlett.
4. The Capture of Natural or Organic Racial Progress. Finally, the
Bartlett plurality stressed how Section 2 ensures equal opportunity to
elect one’s representatives, but crossover districts suggest that this
opportunity already exists.227 While the Court admired the legislature’s
creation of crossover districts that capitalized on racial unity, the
plurality stated that Section 2 is not meant to preserve every instance

222. Id. at 2111.
223. See supra notes 211–11 and accompanying text.
224. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 22 (plurality opinion) (“Disregarding the majority-minority rule
and relying on a combination of race and party to presume an effective majority would
involve . . . a perilous enterprise.”).
225. See id. at 14–15, 21 (noting the racial and political considerations associated with
crossover claims).
226. For example, the court could simply look to the presence of a minority group, without
engaging in hairsplitting over its composition, and proceed with standard Gingles analysis.
227. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 14 (plurality opinion) (“But because they form only 39 percent
of the voting-age population in District 18, African-Americans standing alone have no better or
worse opportunity to elect a candidate than does any other group of voters with the same relative
voting strength.”).
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of majority–minority unity where it exists.228 In other words, some
developments of unity and progress in the community are organic or
natural, and the VRA is not meant to capture these. Instead, the VRA
is supposed to be used where growth and unity are absent.
This argument by the Bartlett Court provides a sharp distinction
between aggregated and crossover claims. First, aggregated claims do
not represent growth toward unity the way that crossover claims do.
They do not feature White voters crossing racial lines in a way that
would make the claims nonactionable under Section 2, as the Bartlett
Court sees it.229 Instead, aggregated claims reflect harsh racial divisions
in voting between minority groups and the majority. Assuming Gingles
is met, this means that the majority and minority groups vote as blocs—
with the majority nearly always winning out. In crossover claims, the
precise opposite is happening—the majority bloc is breaking down. If
more majority voters join them, the minority groups can win.230 Second,
under the plurality’s view, Section 2’s enforcement rules can be
analogized to the rules that a referee would employ. Generally, courts
let the political process continue unless someone commits a foul.231
Crossover districts embody the game being played fairly, but dilution
of a minority group’s voting power by a strong majority bloc is a foul.
Aggregated claims again look more like single-minority group claims
than crossover claims. In both single-minority group and aggregated
claims, bloc voting is preventing minority preferences from being
elected, and the groups are strongly segregated. By contrast, the
Bartlett Court’s 50 percent threshold rule implies that in crossover
claims, segregation is likely “waning.”232 Third, unlike crossover claims,
aggregated claims represent the entrenchment of racially based voting
and districting, not their diminishing.233 As Professor Sheryll Cashin
predicts, racism will likely get worse as America becomes increasingly
pluralistic, and only once society moves past the majority–minority
228. See id. at 15 (“Section 2 does not impose on those who draw election districts a duty to
give minority voters the most potential, or the best potential, to elect a candidate by attracting
crossover voters.”).
229. Id. at 14.
230. See id. at 24 (noting the tension with the third Gingles precondition).
231. This is in line with the United States v. Carolene Products Co. view of the Constitution,
where courts use more exacting scrutiny when the political processes are turned against “discrete
and insular minorities.” United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
232. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 16–17 (plurality opinion) (noting the tension with the first Gingles
precondition).
233. See id. at 25 (characterizing crossover voting as the “waning” of racial voting).
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threshold will the nation be able to begin to heal.234 Thus, aggregated
claims are properly viewed as distinguishable from crossover claims.
III. AGGREGATED CLAIMS UNDER THE TEXT OF SECTION 2
Though distinguishable, the mere fact that aggregated claims may
not be foreclosed by prior rationales leaves quite a bit to be desired.
This Part sates that desire. To do so, it advances a novel statutory
argument, built on the text of Section 2, that aggregated claims are
permissible. It first details the arguments featured in the relevant
circuit splits, focusing on the Sixth Circuit’s analysis of the issue. Then,
this Part asserts that the singular–plural canon of interpretation can
help legal readers parse the text in a meaningful way—and one which
confirms that aggregated claims are indeed permissible.
A. A Circuit Split Emerges: Aggregated Claims in the Lower Courts
The question of whether Section 2 allowed aggregated claims
resulted in a circuit split starting in the mid-1990s.235 This split resulted
from a sharp textual debate interpreting the phrase “a class of citizens”
in Section 2. Earlier courts used the remedial nature of the VRA,
without much textual analysis, to allow such claims.236 In contrast, later
234. SHERYLL CASHIN, LOVING: INTERRACIAL INTIMACY IN AMERICA AND THE THREAT TO
WHITE SUPREMACY 173–75 (2017); see also SHERYLL CASHIN, INTEGRATION AS A MEANS OF
RESTORING DEMOCRACY AND OPPORTUNITY 75 (2017), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/
files/A_Shared_Future_Chapter_2_Integration_Restoring_Democracy.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6L9783Y] (noting that not only will White “cultural dexterity” be necessary, but that mobilization and
coalition building to encourage public policies of inclusion and integration will also be necessary).
235. See infra notes 236–36.
236. The Fifth Circuit and Eleventh Circuit explicitly allowed such claims. See Concerned
Citizens of Hardee Cnty. v. Hardee Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 906 F.2d 524, 526 (11th Cir. 1990)
(allowing such claims); Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1988) (same).
The Second and Ninth Circuits implicitly allowed aggregated claims to proceed. See Bridgeport
Coal. For Fair Representation v. City of Bridgeport, 26 F.3d 271, 274–77 (2d Cir.), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 512 U.S. 1283 (1994) (applying Gingles preconditions to a claim
without directly deciding the propriety of aggregated claims); Badillo v. City of Stockton, 956 F.2d
884, 886 (9th Cir. 1992) (same); see also Pope v. County of Albany, 687 F.3d 565, 572 n.5 (2d Cir.
2012) (dismissing on other grounds, likely meaning Bridgeport Coalition is still good law).
The First and Seventh Circuits avoided the question. See Frank v. Forest Cnty., 336 F.3d
570, 575 (7th Cir. 2003) (calling aggregation “problematic”); Latino Pol. Action Comm., Inc. v.
City of Boston, 784 F.2d 409, 414 (1st Cir. 1986) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim because they
failed to establish racial polarization). This allowed district courts in those circuits to address the
question, and the District of Massachusetts held that aggregated claims could survive summary
judgment. Huot v. City of Lowell, 280 F. Supp. 3d 228, 235–37 (D. Mass. 2017); see also Baldus v.
Members of Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd., 849 F. Supp. 2d 840, 857 (E.D. Wis. 2012) (addressing
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courts saw Section 2’s text as sufficiently plain to prohibit aggregated
claims—or implied as much, though some dissents argued that the
combination of textual ambiguity and the VRA’s open-ended and
broad remedial nature should control interpretation.237
The first circuit to consider aggregation—the Fifth Circuit in
Campos v. City of Baytown238—exemplified the early remedial
approach. The Fifth Circuit held that nothing in Section 2 prevented
aggregation, and that aggregation was supported by the congressional
attempts to remedy discrimination facing both groups that was
“pervasive and national in scope.”239 Further, the VRA protects both
language and racial minorities, and thus these voters could be
considered collectively if they “cross the Gingles threshold as
potentially disadvantaged voters” and “actually vote together.”240 In
the claim, the Black and Hispanic populations in Baytown, Texas
challenged the at-large election system for the city’s six council
members.241 The district court found that the aggregated community
was geographically compact enough to constitute a majority within a
redrawn district, the community was politically cohesive, and the
majority voting bloc consistently voted against minority candidates.242
The district court then determined that the totality of the

a potential aggregated claim and noting that evidence of a successful minority coalition would
support finding “no Section 2 violation”). The Huot court held that the First Circuit’s pre-Gingles
case denied an aggregated claim because of a lack of cohesion, and thus was not controlling as to
whether aggregation was permissible. Huot, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 236.
237. The Sixth Circuit explicitly prohibits such claims. Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1392
(6th Cir. 1996) (en banc). The Fourth Circuit called aggregated claims into serious question. See
Hall v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421, 430–31 (4th Cir. 2004) (disallowing crossover claim by stating that
minorities should not be able to numerically join with “other members of the electorate” under
Section 2).
238. Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1988).
239. Id. at 1244.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1241–42. Together, those communities constituted 25.4 percent of the city. Id. at
1241.
242. Id. at 1242; see also id. at 1248–49 (describing the elections that demonstrated a White
voting bloc). Political cohesion was demonstrated at the district court level through regression
analysis of statistically significant data drawn from five elections and presented at trial, which
showed that voting was racially polarized. See id. at 1245–47 (rejecting the use of Precinct 248 and
finding that “Blacks and Hispanics as one minority were politically cohesive” based on statistical
evidence). For instance, candidate Mario Delgado received 83 percent of the minority votes, while
receiving 37 percent of the White vote, and candidate Tony Campos received 63 percent of the
minority vote, while receiving 29 percent of the White vote. Id. at 1249. Both lost their races for
City Council Position 1, Delgado in 1986 and Campos in 1984. Id.
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circumstances established a valid claim of vote dilution, based on
racially polarized voting, “lingering socio-economic effects of past
official discrimination,” and that no minority group member had been
elected to city council.243 The Fifth Circuit affirmed a violation but
vacated and remanded the judgment.244
Soon thereafter, the debate shifted to a largely textual battle:
whether the broad remedial purpose of the VRA or a rigid plain
meaning should control its interpretation.245 This move to the latter
interpretation is best demonstrated by Nixon v. Kent County,246 which
disallowed aggregated claims under Section 2 based on its plain
meaning.247 First, the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc stated that Section 2
never expressly or implicitly mentions coalitions.248 Second, Section 2
uses many singular terms. For example, Section 2 protects an
“individual’s” right to be free from discrimination,249 and the standard
of proof refers to “a class of citizens.”250 Ostensibly, the court reasoned,
if Section 2 allowed aggregation, it would say “classes of citizens” and
refer to “their members,” not “its members.”251 Further, the committee
reports from the 1975 and 1982 amendments never address
aggregation.252 Finally, protected minorities, like all other groups, “join
forces . . . to further their mutual political goals,” implying that these

243. Id. at 1249. The court ordered redistricting based on the City’s proposed plan, which
created five single-member districts, one having a 65.9 percent minority population (44.6 percent
Hispanic, 21.3 percent Black), and three council members elected at large. Id. at 1244.
244. Id. at 1250. The Fifth Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that both groups must
be cohesive individually and cohesive as one community. It required only the latter. Id. at 1245.
245. E.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 894–98 (5th Cir.
1993) (en banc) (Jones, J., concurring).
246. Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
247. Id. at 1386.
248. Id.
249. Id. (emphasis omitted); see also 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2018) (protecting “the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color”).
250. Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1386 (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b)); see § 10301(b) (declaring the
statute has been violated when “political processes . . . are not equally open to participation by
members of a class of citizens . . . in that its members have less opportunity than other members
of the electorate to participate in the political process” (emphasis added)).
251. Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1386 (emphasis omitted). As noted, this Note argues that this text is
implicitly there under the singular–plural canon of interpretation, codified at 1 U.S.C. § 1. See 1
U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (explaining, absent “context indicat[ing] otherwise,” statutory interpretation
requires that “words importing the singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or things
[and] words importing the plural include the singular”); infra Part III.B.
252. Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1387.
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aggregated claims were nothing more than political maneuvering,
which is not protected by Section 2.253
In his dissent, Judge Damon Keith wrote that Section 2 should be
interpreted as a whole.254 First, the phrase “a class of citizens” is
ambiguous because Section 2 protects multiple minorities, and it is not
clear that a “class” must consist of only one group.255 Facially,
differences in the class’s composition are irrelevant to Section 2.
Claimants must simply meet the totality-of-the-circumstances test.256
And interpreting “class” as a limitation on claimants’ rights is
inconsistent with the broadening purpose of the 1982 amendment.257
Further, Judge Keith relied extensively on Chisom v. Roemer,258
where the Supreme Court held that the VRA should be given “the
broadest possible scope.”259 In Chisom, the Court defined
“representative” in Section 2 to include elected state judges, thus
bringing state judicial elections within its ambit.260 The Court did so in
part, because no one disputed “that [Section 2] applied to judicial
elections prior to the 1982 amendment,”261 and if the 1982 amendment
expanded liability, the Chisom Court reasoned that contracting Section
2’s effect, so that it did not reach judicial elections, would be anomalous
without an explicit indication from Congress.262 Using this presumption
of the broadest scope possible, Judge Keith relied on two types of
evidence of textual meaning to find that aggregated claims were
allowed. First, the term “language minorities” was added in 1975
before the allegedly limiting language of a “class” was added in 1982.263

253. Id. at 1391–92.
254. Id. at 1393 (Keith, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 1394, 1398.
256. Id. at 1398–99. Judge Keith also argued that this reading was compelled by the fact that
the attorney general had supported such claims, such as by filing an amicus brief in a failed appeal
to the Supreme Court in the Campos litigation. Id. at 1397. Quite uniquely, the Court has often
given the views of the attorney general on the VRA considerable deference and weight. See
Presley v. Etowah Cnty. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 508–09 (1992) (comparing this deference to
Chevron deference).
257. Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1399 (Keith, J., dissenting).
258. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
259. Id. at 403 (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 567 (1969)); Nixon, 76
F.3d at 1398 (Keith, J., dissenting).
260. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 399.
261. Id. at 390.
262. Id. at 402.
263. Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1394, 1398 (Keith, J., dissenting).
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Judge Keith concluded that the addition of “language minorities” gave
these minorities full voting rights protection in 1975, which included
the possibility of aggregated claims brought by racial and ethnic
minorities.264 Thus, similar to Chisom, where no language or legislative
history had shown an intent to contract the prior protection of the
VRA over judicial elections, the same was true of protections to racial
and language minorities.265 This view, that the term “language
minorities” condoned aggregation, was partially driven by the second
type of evidence. On that front, Judge Keith claimed that Congress was
aware of aggregated (or, in Judge Keith’s words, joint or coalition)
claims when it amended the VRA in 1975 and 1982.266 Thus, without
further indication, Congress would not limit aggregation through the
addition of “class” in 1982 in an amendment that broadened the scope
of the VRA.267
Finally, Judge Keith argued that the majority’s result created the
same evils that the VRA was meant to end.268 The majority’s logic
presupposed racial and ethnic homogeneity and “assume[d] automatic
homogeneity of interest within and automatic divergence of interests
between racial groups.”269 By doing so, the majority simply writes off
the possibility of shared political goals because of a common history of

264. Id. at 1398.
265. See id. at 1399 (“Just as Chisom v. Roemer and Mallory refused to limit ‘representatives’
to legislators, we should refuse to limit ‘protected class’ to a single ethnic group protected under
Section 2.”).
266. Namely, Judge Keith cited Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), where Black and
Puerto Rican voters in New York brought a joint claim. Nixon, 76 F.2d at 1395 (Keith, J.,
dissenting) (citing Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 52 (1964). Congress considered Wright at
least at some point during the hearings for the VRA extensions in 1975. Extension of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965: Hearing on S. 407, S. 903, S. 1297, S. 1409 and S. 1443 Before the Subcomm.
on Const. Rts. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 965 (1975) [hereinafter Extension of
the Voting Rights Act Hearing]. It also seems that there was another potential aggregated claim
before Congress. See Sette, supra note 29, at 2707 & n.124, 2729 & n.382 (noting that Wright was
a constitutional claim, but that the Senate Report mentioned another aggregated claim); infra
note 313. The majority simply rejected this inference wholesale without much discussion because,
in its view, Section 2 had never applied to aggregated claims, and so no inference from history
could be made. Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1389.
267. See Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1395 (Keith, J., dissenting) (“If Congress was thus aware that more
than one minority group could be considered to constitute one plaintiff class in determining the
availability of Voting Rights Act protection, certainly the absence of an explicit prohibition of
minority coalition claims compels a construction of Section 2 which allows them.”).
268. Id. at 1400–02. Judge Keith also noted that courts do not conduct purity tests to see if the
majority bloc is of “Italian, German or Yugoslavian descent.” Id. at 1402.
269. Id. at 1400.
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discrimination.270 This assumption, which segregates and classifies
minority groups, runs counter to the Constitution and purposes of the
VRA, because these classifications will deny rights (and the
subsequent remedies) under the VRA solely on the basis of race or
ethnicity.271
As a result of the competing remedial and textual approaches,
there is uncertainty as to whether aggregation could be recognized
under Section 2. Further uncertainty results from the fact that Bartlett’s
impact on this divide remains unclear. Despite a somewhat lively
scholarly debate surrounding the import of Bartlett, courts still
recognize aggregated claims in jurisdictions that already allowed
aggregated claims.272 The dearth of circuit court decisions addressing
Bartlett likely stems from courts not being precluded from hearing
aggregation claims. Further, the rationales for distinguishing crossover
claims from aggregated claims undermine the arguments advanced by
the circuits disallowing aggregation. First, with regard to the risk of
interest group politics, the line drawing between single-minority group
claims and aggregated claims is dubious at best.273 The fact that a
community has a common goal should not bar representation that it is
entitled to obtain via Section 2.274 Section 2 claims go far beyond
common politics, requiring that claimants meet the Gingles
preconditions and the totality-of-the-circumstances test.275 Second,
although the VRA and its legislative history never explicitly mention
aggregated districts as a remedy, the same is true for single-minority

270. Id. at 1401.
271. Id. at 1399–1400.
272. E.g., Huot v. City of Lowell, 280 F. Supp. 3d 228, 235–37 (D. Mass. 2017); Perez v.
Abbott, 250 F. Supp. 3d 123, 143 (W.D. Tex. 2017); Ga. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Gwinnett
Cnty. Bd. of Registrations & Elections, No. 1:16-cv-2852-AT, 2017 WL 4250535, at *1–2 (N.D.
Ga. May 12, 2017); Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 231 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1048 (M.D. Ala.
2017); Pope v. County of Albany, No. 1:11–cv–0736 (LEK/CFH), 2014 WL 316703, at *1, *6
(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2014); Broward Citizens for Fair Dists. v. Broward Cnty., No. 12–60317–CIV,
2012 WL 1110053, at *1, *6 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2012); Rodriguez v. Pataki, 308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 405
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. County of Albany, No.
03-CV-502, 2003 WL 21524820, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. July 7, 2003); Memorandum of Law of Plaintiffs
at 5, Hardial v. Town Council of the Town of Hempstead, No. CV-13 2452 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 23,
2013), 2013 WL 10230644.
273. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
274. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 51 (1986) (requiring political cohesion under
Section 2).
275. See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text.
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group districts.276 Third, the Sixth Circuit and others rely on the text,
particularly the singular nature of “class.”277 However, Judge Keith is
likely right that “class” can include aggregated communities, because
the VRA never defines “class.”278 These arguments are supported by
the broad remedial nature of the VRA and by the fact that the evil
solved by aggregated claims is the same as by single-minority group
claims.279
B. Novel Textual Arguments in Favor of Aggregated Claims
Even assuming courts do not agree with Judge Keith’s
interpretation that the singular “class” allows for aggregation, the
opposition’s textual argument is undermined by the singular–plural
canon of interpretation.280 Codified by Congress, this canon instructs
that singular terms in statutes also include the plural form unless
context shows otherwise.281 For example, if a statute proscribes the
firing of “a rocket,” firing multiple rockets is also proscribed.282 The
rocket statute would ban the simultaneous firing of multiple rockets
taped together. Likewise, simultaneous discrimination against multiple
protected groups is banned under Section 2. Thus, aggregated claims
are still permissible under Section 2.
Importantly, this interpretation does no violence to the text and
helps ground the scope of Section 2. Again, Section 2 reads:

276. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 31 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“There is nothing
in the statutory text to suggest that Congress meant to protect minority opportunity to elect solely
by the creation of majority-minority districts.”).
277. E.g., Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1386–87 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc). The Fourth
Circuit relied upon Section 2’s language that members of a class have “less opportunity than other
members of the electorate.” Hall v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421, 425 n.5, 430 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2018)).
278. Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1394, 1403 (Keith, J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 1394, 1402.
280. See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (“[U]nless the context indicates otherwise—words importing the
singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or things . . . .”); SCALIA & GARNER, supra
note 32, at 130 (referring to the singular–plural canon as “simply a matter of common sense and
everyday linguistic experience”). This is also recognized in many states. See, e.g., MICH. CODE
ANN. § 125.402 (2019) (“[T]he singular number includes the plural and the plural the
singular . . . .”). Admittedly, no one else advances the singular–plural argument for Section 2, this
Note found, but others have made it for other sections of the VRA. See Travis Crum, Note, The
Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation and Dynamic Preclearance, 119
YALE L.J. 1992, 2007 n.88 (2010) (using this argument in the context of Section 3 of the VRA).
281. 1 U.S.C. § 1.
282. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 32, at 130.
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if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political
processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a
class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have
less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate
in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.283

Applying the singular–plural canon, absent some indication that
Congress did not want aggregated claims, this can also be logically read
as allowing claims when “members of classes of citizens” are not
equally allowed to participate, “in that their members have less
opportunity . . . to participate.” Thus, the singular form encapsulates a
single-minority group’s claims, alleging discrimination against “a
class.” The natural way to make sense of “classes” then is that
claimants can assert discriminatory effects befalling more than one
minority group simultaneously.
Several pieces of textual evidence confirm this interpretation.
First, Congress codified this canon through the Dictionary Act,
essentially telling readers that, “unless the context indicates
otherwise,”284 the term “a class” imports the term “classes.” This
reading is supported by the drafting manuals in the House and Senate,
which apply the same presumption of singularity unless Congress
intends to deviate.285 And the context of Section 2 does not justify a

283. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2018).
284. 1 U.S.C. § 1; see FDIC v. RBS Sec., Inc., 798 F.3d 244, 258 (5th Cir. 2015) (acknowledging
the authority of the Dictionary Act as the “default rule that the singular includes the plural”); 2A
NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:34 (7th
ed.), Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2020) (“These rules reflect the common understanding that
the English language does not always carefully differentiate between singular and plural word
forms . . . .”). But see United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 422 n.5 (2009) (stating in dicta that the
Court traditionally applied the Dictionary Act’s singular–plural rule when “necessary to carry out
the evident intent of the statute” (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 657 (1924)));
id. at 432 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s characterization of the singular–
plural canon is “contrary” to the text of the Dictionary Act). Not only has Hayes not been
generative, but the Court has also not applied this narrow construction of the Dictionary Act
consistently. Cf., e.g., Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 139 S. Ct. 1853, 1857 (2019) (noting
that the Dictionary Act’s canon that the term “person” includes the federal government is “an
express directive from Congress”); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 707–08
(2014) (relying on the Dictionary Act canon that “person” includes a corporation); Carr v. United
States, 560 U.S. 438, 448 (2010) (describing the canon that the present tense includes the present
and future tense as a presumption created by the Dictionary Act).
285. See OFF. OF THE LEGIS. COUNS., U.S. SENATE, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING MANUAL 5 (1997),
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/Faculty/SenateOfficeoftheLegislativeCounsel_
LegislativeDraftingManual%281997%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/DT2N-7EZ5] (“The singular includes
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deviation from this presumption because of the consistent use of the
singular form when referring to “class” throughout Section 2.
Congress’s unwavering usage of the singular form of “class”
throughout Section 2 and the rest of the VRA suggests a consistent
stylistic or grammatical choice, rather than an intent to exclude the
plural.286 Not once in the whole of Title 52 of the U.S. Code did
Congress use the term “classes.”287 And the singular form of class is
reserved almost exclusively in the VRA for Section 2, which is
consistent with (if not implying) a unique meaning for groups who can
bring claims under Section 2.288 When referencing those entitled to
protections, the rest of the statute refers to them as “language
minorities,” “language minority groups,” “minority persons,”
“minority group[s],” or as “minority group citizens.”289 The 1982
amendments thus have a virtual monopoly on the term, and the
linguistic distance between class and the panoply of other terms used
to reference minority groups likely means that the former is not totally
coextensive with the latter. Or at the very least, the former under the
singular–plural canon can support a broader meaning than the latter.

the plural . . . .”); OFF. OF THE LEGIS. COUNS., U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HOUSE
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL’S MANUAL ON DRAFTING STYLE 60 (1995), https://legcounsel.house.gov/
sites/legcounsel.house.gov/files/documents/draftstyle.pdf [https://perma.cc/XZ4D-VKWV] (instructing
legislators to “[a]void plurals”); see also FREDERICK REED DICKERSON, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING 67
(1954) (“To the extent your meaning allows, use the singular instead of the plural.”); FREDERICK REED
DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING 124–25 (1965) (same). Three Justices
indicated that drafting manuals can be a source of statutory interpretation in Carr. See Carr, 560 U.S.
at 459, 463 (Alito, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas, J. & Ginsburg, J.) (applying a rule of construction
drawn from legislative drafting manuals).
286. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).
287. This was confirmed through the following Westlaw search: limited to results within Title
52 of the United States Code Annotated: “adv.: class!” and then sifting through the minimal
references for both the plural and singular terms.
288. In the VRA, the term “class” is used outside of Section 2 only in 52 U.S.C. §§ 10501(b),
10303(c). It was first included in the original act in 1965, but only once, when referring to a
prohibited test or device used to “prove [the voter’s] qualifications by the voucher of registered
voters or members of any other class.” It was not used in the 1975, 1992, or 2006 amendments. See
generally Pub. L. No. 94-73, Title I, § 102, 89 Stat. 400 (1975); Pub. L. No. 102-344, 106 Stat. 921
(1992); Pub. L. No. 109–246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006). And, while the 1970 amendments used the term
once, it was only in the context of moving the test or device text of the 1965 Act verbatim. See
generally Pub. L. No. 91-285, Title II, 84 Stat. 314, 315 (1970).
289. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 10303(a)(1)(F)(iii), (a)(2), 10310(c)(3), 10503(a). And in its 2006
reauthorization factual findings, Congress called these individuals “racial and language minority
voters” or “racial and language minority citizens,” never referring to either individually as
composing or being part of a “class.” 120 Stat. 577, 578.
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Moreover, Congress already approved of aggregation in the
context of language minorities. Language minority groups explicitly
include multiethnic, multicultural, and most importantly multilingual
groups.290 Asians could have diverse lingual and cultural ties—and yet
still get the protection of Section 2, even collectively. Chinese and Thai
communities could qualify as individual classes or form an aggregate
Asian class under Section 2. Further, Hispanic groups can be composed
of members with ethnic ties to Spain, Peru, and Mexico, all while
meeting the statutory definition of being “of Spanish heritage.”291 All
of these demonstrate that plurality is not inconsistent with the statute
and is in fact more consistent with the statute than rigidly imposing
singularity. From this point of view, the Nixon majority started with the
wrong presumption from consistent singularity. Instead of presuming
the text as encompassing “class” and “classes,” as Congress instructed,
the Nixon court presumed that the text excluded the plural.
Further evidence of context shows that the term “class” is
generally uninstructive to readers because of how disconnected it is
from other sections of the statute defining language minorities.292 The
statute refers to citizens of a “language minority group,” or “language
minorities,” and never directly refers to them as classes—and Section
2 indirectly considers them part of the term protected class.293 And
Congress ostensibly knows how to clarify whether it meant only one
protected group of citizens. For example, in § 10303, Congress
outlawed certain English-only ballots if more than 5 percent of votingage citizens were from “a single language minority.”294 Likewise, if
Congress really wanted to be clear, it could have said “a single group”
or “a single class.” Still, at worst, this type of evidence reinforces the
ambiguity here. After all, the reason why this circuit split is tough to
resolve is specifically because Congress uses language inconsistently,
with little clarity and precision. But the whole purpose of textual
canons of construction is to break ties when there is ambiguity. Thus,

290. See Sette, supra note 29, at 2728 (noting the inherent coalitional aspect of language
minorities).
291. 52 U.S.C. § 10310(c)(3).
292. See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (using “class” without any definition of language
minorities); id. § 10503(c) (referencing “the language of the applicable minority group”); id.
§ 10503(e) (“[T]he term ‘language minorities’ or ‘language minority group’ means persons who
are American Indian, Asian American, Alaskan Natives, or of Spanish heritage.”).
293. Id. § 10503(c).
294. Id. § 10303(f)(3).
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courts should defer to Congress’s judgment, and not their own, on
which types of claims should be allowed.295
Additionally, the other phrasing of Section 2 does not foreclose
the use of this canon. Although the VRA refers to “members of a class
of citizens,” this phrasing is simply the most natural way to discuss
individuals in a group—since a group will be bringing the claim.296 And
while at least one court reasoned that “other members of the
electorate” precludes coalitional claims, at least in the crossover
context, because it is totally exclusionary of any other group, this view
simply fails to contemplate the possibility of aggregation and
community-building.297 Read plainly, the term “other” is made in
reference to groups that have more opportunity “to participate in the
political process.”298 At least in the context of a single-minority group
community’s claim, which asserts that it has “less opportunity,” “other
members” refers to those who are not members of that community.
When two or more minority communities assert a claim in the
aggregate, the “other members of the electorate” are those who are not
members of any one of those communities asserting the claim.
Admittedly, the article (“a”) that precedes “class” could indicate
that the word “classes” was not intended. However, “a” is an indefinite
article, and courts generally treat indefinite articles as allowing both
singular and plural terms.299 By contrast, definite articles, like “the,”
are more likely to lock in a selected form.300 For example, Congress
295. Although Congress could then amend Section 2 if it did not like these claims, this
argument suffers from a “dog that didn’t bark” critique. This reasoning may be stronger from the
fact that Congress specifically amended the VRA after Campos and Hardee County Board
allowed such claims and again in 2006 after this circuit split arose. See discussion supra notes 236–
36 and accompanying text.
296. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (emphasis added).
297. This is more or less the argument made in Hall v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421, 430 (4th Cir.
2004).
298. Id.
299. See 2A DALLAS SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:34 (4th ed.
1972) (“It is most often ruled that a term introduced by ‘a’ or ‘an’ applies to multiple subjects or
objects unless there is a reason to find that singular application was intended or is reasonably
understood.”); see, e.g., United States v. Pendergrass, No. 1:17-CR-315-LMM-JKL, 2019 WL
1376745, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2019) (applying the Dictionary Act’s singular–plural
interpretation); In re Cell Tower Recs. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(D), 90 F. Supp. 3d 673, 676–77
(S.D. Tex. 2015) (same). This is also the rule in patent law. E.g., Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v.
Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
300. E.g., Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., 764 F.3d 1199,
1227 (10th Cir. 2014); Frazier v. Pioneer Ams. LLC, 455 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2006); Lunsford
v. Mills, 766 S.E.2d 297, 302 (N.C. 2014).
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could have written “the class” or “said class.” And the rule regarding
indefinite articles makes grammatical sense because Congress would
never write “members of class of citizens.” Congress’s choice to make
the singular noun grammatically correct should not exclude the plural.
Such an interpretation would undermine the very reason for the
singular–plural canon.301
Further, presuming “classes” from the text is consistent with the
context of the VRA because Congress added subsection (b), which
contains the term “class,” in the 1982 amendment, and significantly
expanded the scope of Section 2—and especially because language
minorities already have access to aggregation.302 It would be
incongruent to interpret subsection (b) as a severe limitation on the
rights of claimants.303
Even the Nixon court admitted that the statutory inclusion of
“classes” would permit aggregation.304 However, the word class
necessarily implies the existence of multiple classes, and the existence
of “classes” in Section 2 is more consistent with the presumptions set
up by the Dictionary Act and the singular–plural canon.
Finally, although opponents state that Congress never meant to
validate aggregated claims with the VRA,305 “prohibitions often go
beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils.”306
Nowhere more pertinent is this philosophy than in the context of the
VRA, which was meant to “overcome systematic and ingenious
discrimination,” and “ensure the right to vote when local officials are
determined to deny it.”307 Congress in 1965 stressed “both the variety
301. Proving that “a” precedes singular nouns does not counter this argument. No one would
argue that “a class” is plural. Instead, the context of the statute does not undermine the
importation of “classes” mandated by the Dictionary Act. At best, “a” is ambiguous, and a single
word should not be the reason for the disallowance of aggregation. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“[Congress] does not, one might say, hide elephants in
mouseholes.”).
302. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986) (describing Congress’s intent when
amending Section 2).
303. The apparent limitations on the 1982 amendment seem to be explicitly enumerated in
the Senate Report, and none of them mention aggregation. See id. at 46 (describing the limitations
in the Senate Report); see discussion supra note 104.
304. Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1386 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
305. See id. at 1390 (concluding that neither the original statute nor the subsequent
amendments “reflect a broad and boundless ‘trend’ to expand the Act . . . to protect combinations
of classes not described in the Act, including coalition minorities”).
306. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
307. Johnson, supra note 59.
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of means used” as well as “the durability” of the attacks on voting
rights.308 Consistently, Congress has expanded the VRA, rejecting
multiple attempts by the courts to limit its reach. Now the VRA is given
the “broadest possible scope,”309 to eliminate the “broad array of
dilution schemes . . . employed to cancel the impact” of minority
votes.310 That is because both the VRA and Section 2 reflect a goal, a
standard to be reached, not a formalistic rule. That standard is to reach
equal opportunity in electoral politics, a desire in tension with the
existence of myriad schemes of discrimination that constantly contort
into new forms, the ingenuity of which “seems endless.”311
Aggregation targets the same evil—racial and ethnic
discrimination in voting—as single minority group claims. The Senate
Report for the 1975 VRA amendments—that added language minority
protection—confirms as much.312 The Senate noted how language
minorities were treated “like [B]lacks throughout the South,” and how
Mexican Americans in Texas, who exemplified language minority
treatment, together with Black Texans faced a long history of
mistreatment “similar to the myriad forms of discrimination practiced
against [B]lacks in the South.”313 Disallowing aggregation is to say that
308. H.R. REP. NO. 89-439, at 8 (1965).
309. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403 (1991).
310. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 6 (1982); see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309
(1966) (stating that the VRA’s purpose is to fight the “insidious and pervasive evil which had been
perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance”).
311. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 6.
312. S. REP. NO. 94-295, at 25–28 (1975).
313. Id. at 25. There were at least two cases in which joint or proto-aggregated claims were
considered by courts and by the Senate in 1975. First, Wright v. Rockefeller was referred to several
times in a Senate hearing and involved a form of joint (albeit a constitutional and not statutory)
claim brought by Puerto Rican and Black New Yorkers. Extension of the Voting Rights Act
Hearing, supra note 266, at 249, 965; Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 56 (1964); Nixon v. Kent
Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1395 (6th Cir. 1996) (Keith, J., dissenting) (citing Wright); Sette, supra note
29, at 2707 n.124 (noting that Wright was a constitutional and not a statutory claim). Second, the
Senate Report refers to a 1972 Texas court case brought by Mexican American and Black voters
that was partially affirmed by the Supreme Court. S. REP. NO. 94-295, at 25; Graves v. Barnes
(Graves I), 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex. 1972), aff’d in part White v. Regester (White I), 412 U.S.
755 (1973). While the initial order of the district court in 1972, affirmed by the Supreme Court,
seems to have only dealt with separate claims by Black voters for Dallas County and Mexican
American voters for Bexar County because of time constraints, later opinions addressed protoaggregated claims and required the drawing of single-member districts based on combined
Mexican American and Black populations with histories of discrimination. Graves v. Barnes
(Graves II), 378 F. Supp. 640, 644–62 (W.D. Tex. 1974), vacated by White v. Regester (White II),
422 U.S. 935, 935–36 (1975) (per curiam) (vacating the case, “[r]ather than render an unnecessary
judgment on the validity of the constitutional views expressed by the District Court,” for the
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discrimination is fine so long as it affects two minority groups instead
of one. The gap between traditional and aggregated claims is a
difference in degree, not form.
CONCLUSION
Bartlett represented a significant shift in voting rights but not one
that precludes aggregation. The end of crossover claims does not mean
the end of aggregated claims because aggregated claims meet the same
objectives of the VRA as with single-minority group claims. More
broadly, aggregated claims align with the spirit of the Fifteenth
Amendment, which was “not designed to punish for the past” but “to
ensure a better future.”314 From the standpoint of electoral
representation and voting rights, this country has come a long way. But
to appreciate the past is hardly to observe the realities of the present.
Representation at all levels of government, while it is not the be-all and
end-all, is a critical value in a diverse society. And aggregated claims
can help communities increase representation they deserve. At the end
of the day, that representation is a proxy, but a useful one, for whether
minority groups have equal opportunity in the electoral process. The
VRA played a large role in ensuring a better future for Americans of
all backgrounds, so that they can not only vote but also know that their
vote means something. And the VRA’s promise should apply no less
when discrimination occurs against multiple groups because racism
should not thrive by targeting two and not one.

district court to consider recent apportionment legislation enacted in Texas). While the 1974
decision was not directly addressed in the Senate Report, the developments of this case were
addressed in a hearing that was cited in the same discussion of the Senate Report. Extension of
the Voting Rights Act, supra note 266, at 490 (referring implicitly to the 1974 Graves II case by
citing to White v. Regester—the 1973 case in which the Supreme Court partially affirmed the
district court in Graves I—and referencing the 1974 developments of Graves I in which the Texas
court “ruled the use of the at-large scheme to be unconstitutional”); S. REP. NO. 94-295, at 27
(citing page 490 of the hearings); see also Extension of the Voting Rights Act, supra note 266, at
476 (citing explicitly Graves II).
314. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 553 (2013).

